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Pride and Prejudice and Proof:
Quotidian Factfinding and Rules of Evidence
ROSANNA CAVALLARO*
Can we, in daily life, understand each other?
-E.M. FORSTER'
INTRODUCTION
Among the many intersections between law and literature is this:
Just as the legal process is concerned with the accurate and orderly
evaluation of disputed facts and past events, and the parts played by
people in those events,2 so, too, many works of fiction concern them-
selves with identical inquiries.' What makes a good or great novel is, to
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. A.B., Harvard College, J.D. Harvard Law
School. My thanks go first to Professor Roger Park, whose suggestion of Pride and Prejudice as sum-
mer reading for evidence teachers set me on this Article's path. In addition, I am grateful for the thor-
ough research of Michael Dowley, and for the continuing support of Dean Robert H. Smith.
i. E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 100 (1927).
2. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 102 (purpose and construction of rules "to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined"). But see Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Natural-
ized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (20OI) (recognizing that al-
though "Fed. R. Evid. 102 defines the 'purpose' of the rules as 'that the truth may be ascertained,'
some of the rules have non-veritistic dimension, while others mix veritistic and non-veritistic con-
cerns"). Certainly, the traditional assumption has been that the primary purpose of adjudication is
truthseeking, although this premise has been challenged by a variety of scholars proposing alternative
purposes. See Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, iOI COLUM. L.
REV. 1227, 1230 (2001) (suggesting that "the rules governing what happens inside the courtroom can
be understood adequately only in the context of the state's central project of regulating behavior out-
side the courtroom" through the provision of incentives for that behavior) (citing, as an example of the
truth seeking approach, inter alia, H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illu-
sion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (1982) ("The process of litiga-
tion is designed for the reconstruction of an event that occurred in the recent past."), and citing, as an
example of the non truth seeking approach, inter alia, Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (contending that
the purpose of adjudication is to produce "acceptable verdicts")); David P. Leonard, The Use of Char-
acter to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. I, 38-43
(Winter 1986-87) (suggesting that the role of trial is to produce "catharsis").
Even if some of these interests are furthered by adjudication, there can be little doubt that the
appearance and/or actuality of truthseeking are important aspects of the trial process.
3. The term "novel" can describe a broad range of works of fictional narrative prose, or, more
narrowly, a singular literary genre distinguishable from, e.g., romance, epic, or even satire. Compare
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 8o9 (i97o) (defining "novel" as "an invented prose
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some degree, measured by the novelist's skill in rendering characters and
events for the reader's evaluation, through dialogue and other descrip-
tive narrative In addition, just as the legal process asks judge or jury to
evaluate a variety of proofs in order to allocate criminal blame or civil
liability, novels invite the reader to exercise her judgment about indi-
viduals and events, to determine, by the novel's end, the truth of those
events. Finally, where the legal system has constructed rules of evidence
to shape the body of proof that may be used to determine facts,5 writers
of fiction offer the reader a variety of "proofs" by which she may judge
the truth of their works.6
narrative that is long and complex and deals with human experience through a connected sequence of
events"), with NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICIsM 304 (957) (suggesting that the novel's "charac-
teristics, whatever they are, are such as make, say, Defoe, Fielding, Austen, and James central in its
tradition, and Borrow, Peacock, Melville, and Emily Bronte somehow peripheral"). M.M. Bakhtin
describes the novel as a broad literary form that "took shape precisely at the point when epic distance
was disintegrating, when both the world and man were assuming a degree of comic familiarity, when
the object of artistic representation was being degraded to the level of a contemporary reality that was
inconclusive and fluid." M.M. BAKHTIN, Epic and Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS
5,39 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981). Bakhtin describes, too, a
"lengthy battle for the novelization of the other genres [of literature] ... a battle to drag them into a
zone of contact with reality." Id.
4. See, e.g., FRYE, supra note 3, at 354 ("The objective world affords a provisional means of uni-
fying experience, and it is natural to infer a higher unity, a sort of beatification of common sense.");
ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS 554 (Willard R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1953) (surveying differ-
ent literary periods' attitudes toward the place and significance of "random individuals from daily life
in their dependence upon current historical circumstances").
5. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § I (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) ("The law of
evidence is the system of rules and standards regulating the admission of proof at the trial of a law-
suit.").
6. Such proof runs the gamut from the "objective" first and third person narratives of classic
Victorian fiction like Charles Dickens's Bleak House or Anthony Trollope's Barchester Towers, to the
purposely distorted "testimony" of more contemporary narrators like Oskar Matzerath in Guinter
Grass's The Tin Drum, to the shifting multiple consciousnesses of Virginia Woolf's fiction. Indeed,
where the Victorian novel is characterized by a kind of unreflecting narrative authority and a corre-
sponding passivity by the reader, modern fiction invites the reader to perform a critical evaluation of
the factfinding process through techniques like the self-conscious manipulation of aspects of a singular,
subjective individual's testimonial credibility, and the construction of a near-objective reality "by
means of numerous subjective impressions received by various individuals (and at various times)."
AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 536. Compare CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1 (Stephen Gill ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1998) (1853) ("London. Michelmas Term lately over, and the Lord Chancellor sitting
in Lincoln's Inn Hall."), with GONTER GRASS, THE TIN DRUM 15 (Ralph Mannheim trans., Pantheon
Books 1963) ("Granted: I am an inmate of a mental hospital; my keeper is watching me, he never lets
me out of his sight; there's a peephole in the door, and my keeper's eye is the shade of brown that can
never see through a blue-eyed type like me."), and VIRGINIA WOOLF, TO THE LIGrrHOUSE (1927). See
also AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 535 (comparing the "attitude" of Virginia Woolf toward her charac-
ters in To the Lighthouse- "representing herself to be someone who doubts, wonders, hesitates, as
though the truth about her characters were not better known to her than it is to them or to the
reader"-with "that of authors [like Dickens, Meredith, Balzac, or Zola] who interpret the actions,
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As a work of fiction, Jane Austen's 1813 novel Pride and Prejudice
allows the reader an extraordinary opportunity to make connections be-
tween literary and adjudicatory factfinding by presenting the correspon-
dence at multiple levels.7 Like many works of fiction, Pride and Prejudice
presents narrative "proofs" for the reader's evaluation, but in addition to
this, the novel takes as its central theme the evaluative process itself.
Throughout the book, Austen's characters struggle to form judgments
about each other even as they are simultaneously evaluated by the
reader.8 At its heart, Pride and Prejudice is about the difficulty of deter-
mining the truth-about the character of another, or the nature of an
event-and about the mistakes and injuries that are possible when peo-
ple attempt to form such conclusions. Since the protagonists' determina-
tions hinge, in large part, on their perceptions of past events in which
those being judged9 have played important parts, the novel invites the
reader to reflect upon how we find facts in our ordinary lives. In so do-
ing, the novel resonates in a number of useful ways with the legal fact-
finding process."
This Article proposes to explore the factfinding in which Austen's
characters engage in Pride and Prejudice against the backdrop of the
situations, and characters of their personages with objective assurance," telling the reader "out of their
certain knowledge what their characters did, what they felt and thought while doing it, and how their
actions and thoughts were to be interpreted"). Auerbach distinguishes those novelists, like Stendahl
and Balzac, in whose work "we frequently and indeed almost constantly hear what the writer thinks of
his characters and events," from others, like Flaubert, whose "role is limited to selecting the events
and translating them into language ... in the conviction that every event, if one is able to express it
purely and completely, interprets itself and the persons involved in it far better and more completely
than any opinion or judgment appended to it could do." Id. at 486.
7. Tony Tanner, Notes on the Text, in JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 47 (Tony Tanner ed.,
Penguin Books t985) (1813) (noting that the first edition was published in 1813).
8. See text accompanying notes 22-25 (describing the fictional community's first encounter with
Fitzwilliam Darcy).
9. The pun is intended. It is no accident that this term is used to describe both what we ask of
the legal process and how we form opinions about others in our ordinary lives. In addition, throughout
the novel, Elizabeth Bennett, Fitzwilliam Darcy, and others use the terms "just" and "unjust" to de-
scribe the conclusions and character assessments in which they and others engage. See, e.g., AUSTEN,
supra note 7, at 124 (Wickham on Darcy, "I can hardly be just to him."); id. at 252 (Elizabeth to Jane
about Wickham, "I know you will do him such ample justice, that I am growing every moment more
unconcerned and indifferent."); id. at 388 (Elizabeth to Darcy after accepting his proposal: "your feel-
ings were always noble and just"); id. at 376 (Darcy to Elizabeth after she accepts his proposal: "You
know not, you can scarcely conceive, how [Elizabeth's words refusing Darcy's first proposal] have tor-
tured me;-though it was some time, I confess, before I was reasonable enough to allow their jus-
tice.").
to. Examples of disputed facts that are central to each character's assessment of the other include
the treatment of Wickham by Darcy after the death of Darcy's father, the attempted seduction of




Federal Rules of Evidence, with a view to evaluating some of the poli-
cies, perceptions, and principles that underlie those rules of proof. The
goal is to offer a literary evaluation of three bedrock principles of
American evidence: the bans on hearsay and on the use of propensity
evidence, and the restrictions on the use of evidence drawn from privi-
leged communications." In addition, this Article proposes to identify
some of the characteristics that may strengthen or impair the factfinder's
skill in receiving and evaluating proofs.
Although when she wrote Pride and Prejudice, Austen was not at all
concerned with the legal system or its procedures for determining dis-
puted facts, the novel's examination of the kinds of proof that form the
basis of quotidian personal judgments offers fertile ground for evaluating
modes of judicial proof.
In addition, Pride and Prejudice also offers a useful critique of the
factfinder's role. The novel presents an array of characters each of whom
has certain strengths and weaknesses in their judgment of people and
events. 2 Through the characters' triumphs and missteps, the reader is in-
vited to reflect on what qualities make a successful or unsuccessful finder
of fact. Since juries are just people asked to find facts as they ordinarily
do, Austen's examination of how such quotidian factfinding is done en-
ii. Projects with a similar goal, using literature to evaluate law, are now quite common, see, e.g.,
PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE (2000); RICHARD
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1988); BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE:
COOPER, HAWTHORNE, STOWE, AND MELVILLE (1997); RICHARD WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD
(1984); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS
OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984), although I have not come across any involving
Pride and Prejudice or the Rules of Evidence. For writing by a legal scholar on the work of Jane Aus-
ten, see WHITE, supra, at 191 (in which Professor White suggests that Jane Austen's Emma asks the
essentially political questions, "Is it possible to have a larger community whose central value is kind-
ness, its central method conversation?" and "How can we move from an ideally created world of two,
in the text or in the world, to a larger world of social and political life and action?").
12. For those unfamiliar with the novel, Pride and Prejudice tells the story of a family of daugh-
ters in a small English village, and of their mother's matrimonial ambitions for each of them. The two
older girls, Jane and Elizabeth, are the focus of the novel: Jane, the older and somewhat more naive
young woman, and Elizabeth, the younger, smart and quick to form judgments. When Jane and a new
neighbor, Charles Bingley, fall in love, Bingley's family and nearest friend, Fitzwilliam Darcy, act to
extricate him from the romance, believing that Bingley's wealth places him a step above Jane in social
rank and expectations. At the same time, Elizabeth is repeatedly thrown into Darcy's company and
finds that he is rude and condescending. At the novel's midpoint, Elizabeth is surprised and offended
by a marriage proposal from Darcy, in which he describes how he had struggled to overcome his feel-
ings for her because of her lower social status. She later learns that Darcy is in fact a good, if somewhat
reserved, man and that she has misunderstood many of the words and events upon which she had con-
structed her judgment of him. In the end, she marries Darcy and Jane marries Bingley.
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riches our understanding of what juries are capable of doing in adjudica-
tion."
I must acknowledge early on a vulnerability of this genre of scholar-
ship: For this Article to have value in a legal context, one must accept the
premise that the novel's insights have some worth beyond mere enter-
tainment. I contend that, like all great literature, Austen's novel captures
a kind of truth that amplifies and enriches the truth of our own experi-
ence and can therefore offer meaning beyond the aesthetic.'4 The satis-
faction that we get as readers when we observe the missteps of Elizabeth
Bennett and Fitzwilliam Darcy, as well as their subsequent reassessments
of conduct and character, derives in significant part from our recognition
of the aptness of Austen's observations. 5 Were these observations less
true, the novel would be less of a success. Accordingly, to the extent that
we take pleasure in the novel, we implicitly affirm the accuracy of Aus-
ten's insights about those processes.' Having made this leap, I ask next
13. Scholars are already well aware that there are differences of race, gender, class, and other
traits among jurors and that those differences can affect deliberations. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (Univ. of Chi. 1971) (1966) (comprehensive seminal study of the
dynamics of jury deliberation); Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96
YALE L.J. 593, 593-98 (1987) (citing studies).
Other recent scholarship has attempted to integrate ordinary factfinding with that which is re-
quired of us in specific adjudicatory and quasi-adjudicatory settings. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher,
Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding, 3 I-LxRv. HUM. RTs. J. 83, 85,
92-io8, 135 (I990), excerpted in RICHARD LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 452-56 (3d ed. 1995).
14. The novelist and critic E.M. Forster has explained this capacity of literature as follows:
For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own sake and not as a social ad-
junct, is seen to be haunted by a spectre. We cannot understand each other, except in a
rough and ready way; we cannot reveal ourselves, even when we want to; what we call inti-
macy is only a makeshift; perfect knowledge is an illusion. But in the novel we can know
people perfectly and, apart from the general pleasure of reading, we can find here a com-
pensation for their dimness in life. In this direction fiction is truer than history, because it
goes beyond the evidence, and each of us knows from his own experience that there is
something beyond the evidence, and even if the novelist has not got it correctly, well-he
has tried....
And that is why novels, even when they are about wicked people, can solace us; they
suggest a more manageable human race, they give us the illusion of perspicacity and of
power.
FORSTER, supra note I, at 98-99.
15. Id. at 97 ("[A] novel is a work of art, with its own laws, which are not those of daily life, and
that a character in a novel is real when it lives in accordance with such laws.... The barrier of art di-
vides [characters] from us. They are real not because they are like ourselves (though they may be like
us) but because they are convincing.").
i6. Professor James Boyd White cites E.M. Forster's discussion of Jane Austen's Mansfield Park
to explain what makes some fiction "true and false to life":
She is a miniaturist, but never two-dimensional. All her characters are round, or capable of
rotundity.... Why do the characters in Jane Austen give us a slightly new pleasure each
time they come in, as opposed to the merely repetitive pleasure that is caused by a character
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that the reader be willing to use these insights to measure explicitly legal
tools of factfinding.'7
While Austen might not have intended her work to serve as fodder
for such a systemic critique, her intention to challenge readers about the
nature of quotidian factfinding and the search for truth cannot be
doubted. Her title previews that intention, declaring that the subjects of
the narrative are two human attributes that can obstruct the search for
truth: pride and prejudice. In addition, although the story is offered
through an unidentified and apparently omniscient narrator, Austen's
irony is on display from the novel's opening: "It is a truth universally ac-
knowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be
in Dickens? Why do they combine so well in a conversation, and draw one another out
without seeming to do so, and never perform? The answer to the question can be put in sev-
eral ways: that, unlike Dickens, she was a real artist, that she never stooped to caricature,
etc. But the best reply is that her characters though smaller than his are more highly organ-
ized. They function all round .... All the Jane Austen characters are ready for an extended
life, for a life which the scheme of her books seldom requires them to lead, and that is why
they lead their actual lives so satisfactorily.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION t 13-15 (abridged ed. 1985) (quoting FORSTER, supra note
I, ch. 4).
But Professor White also acknowledges that, for some critics, fictional "truth" falls far short of
actual truth. He quotes Norman Douglas's essay on D.H. Lawrence, in which, according to Douglas,
Lawrence fails to achieve truth because of his "novelist's touch":
What is this touch? It consists, I should say, in a failure to realize the profundities and com-
plexities of the ordinary human mind; it selects for literary purposes two or three facets of a
man or woman, generally the most spectacular and therefore "useful" ingredients of their
character, and disregards all the others.... The facts may be correct so far as they go, but
there are too few of them; what the author says may be true, and yet by no means the truth.
That is the novelist's touch. It falsifies life.
Id. at 14-15 (quoting Norman Douglas, A Plea for Better Manners, in EXPERIMENTS (1925)). See also
FRYE, supra note 3, at 305 ("The novelist deals with personality, with characters wearing their personae
or social masks. He needs the framework of a stable society, and many of our best novelists have been
conventional to the verge of fussiness.").
17. I recognize that this request is itself problematic since, even though we undoubtedly use our
quotidian factfinding skills in our roles as jurors and adjudicators, there are, nevertheless, important
differences in what we do as factfinders inside and outside a courtroom. As Professor Mueller ex-
plains:
Usually in everyday life we have an option not open to factfmders, which is to do nothing
(reserving decision until matters seem more certain) or to change course when further in-
formation comes to light.
Second, few everyday decisions bear any resemblance to the decisions factfinders make in
lawsuits. Rarely do ordinary people decide issues as momentous as whether large sums of
money should change hands or someone should go to jail. Rarely do ordinary people
choose between sharply disputed versions of facts and responsibility.
Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 367, 383 (1992). Nevertheless, I hope that we can regard Austen's literary examination of quotid-
ian factfinding as having some value for a society of potential jurors and those who must make the
rules governing their conduct. Moreover, as among issues to be decided in the ordinary course of a
nineteenth century upper middle-class life, the issues Austen presents to her protagonists-whom to
choose as one's husband or wife-could hardly be more important.
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in want of a wife."' 8 With such an opening, there can be little doubt that
Austen intended her reader to be teased out of his customary passivity
and engaged in the task of judging. 9 Either the narrator is a fool and the
opening is to be taken at face value, or the narrator is purposefully estab-
lishing a gulf between herself and those ° who accept as a "truth, univer-
sally acknowledged" the above proposition. If the latter, then Austen's
opening lines place the reader on notice that he must decide for himself
which side of the gulf to be on as the story unfolds.
I. DEMEANOR AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Central among its insights about modes of proof, and consistent with
much contemporary social science research,2' Pride and Prejudice sug-
gests to students of evidence that there may be little justification for the
preference for live testimony as against hearsay.22 Instead, Austen's per-
i8. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 51.
I9. Professor White notes, in his essay on Austen's Emma, that the novel "in some respects works
directly on the reader, involving him or her immediately in distortion and misconception. To make
one's way through it all, one must be constantly active and discriminating .. " He suggests that Aus-
ten "can be said to make out of her inherited materials a moral language of extraordinary range, dis-
crimination, and coherence and to teach her reader how to make it his own so that he may use it in his
own life, as an instrument of perception and judgment." WHrrE, supra note 16, at 163. Similarly, in
Pride and Prejudice, Austen instructs the reader in what White terms her "moral language of extraor-
dinary range, discrimination, and coherence," her "instrument of perception and judgment" -through
observing the experiences of the characters whom Austen presents and comments upon. Id.
20. Certainly, characters like Mrs. Bennett do accept this "truth" and proceed to construct their
plans upon it. They are for this reason subject to Austen's ridicule, an additional clue that she does not
mean what she says.
21. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1o78-88 (i99I) (summariz-
ing social science research on the capacity of individuals, acting like jurors, to discern veracity through
demeanor clues); George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, to7 YALE L.J. 575, 578 (1997)
("There is little evidence that regular people do much better than chance at separating truth from lies.
We tend to rely on worthless clues and misread others.") (citing authorities); H. Richard Uviller, Cre-
dence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 788-89
(I993) ("Many people (judges among them) devoutly believe-and the law encourages the belief-
that mendacity is betrayed in involuntary, observable, signs of stress recognizable by anyone who has
lived in contact with fellow humans through the ordinary experiences of life. All the evidence avail-
able-and it is a considerable quantity-is to the contrary. Much as we would like to affirm the utility
of the hearsay principle and the Confrontation Clause, much as we (or some of us) feel in our guts that
we know a liar when we see one, it would be foolish for the critical observer to repose much confi-
dence in the revelations of live testimony."); Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PsY-
CHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 485,485 (1999) (observing that "rules of evidence, including the hearsay rules,
certainly lack any scientific basis; they derive from a set of behavioral assumptions, what one commen-
tator has memorably called fireside inductions") (citing P.E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions:
Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 27 J. Soc. IssuEs 65 (97I)).
22. That preferencing is manifested, inter alia, in the constitutionally guaranteed right of confron-
tation, U.S. CONST. amend. V; the right of cross-examination, see Davis v. Alaska. die, U.S. 308, 316-17
(10974); the ban on hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 802; and the array of rules that give the jury primacy in de-
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haps pivotal concern in the first half of the novel is with the mischief that
we make for ourselves when we are excessively confident that we can.
judge a character by evaluating a person's own words and demeanor
firsthand. She makes this point by the use of narrative counterpoint in
the main and subplots: Elizabeth errs as to Darcy and Wickham, while
Jane and Bingley know each other but err in deferring to the opinions of
others. In this way, Austen works both ends of the factfinding equation,
exploring the nature of the proof relied on as well as the quality of the
factfinder's judgment. Hers is not a blanket condemnation of demeanor
evidence as against hearsay, or of hearsay as against demeanor, but is in-
stead a complex calibration of the intersection of these classes of proof
with diverse characteristics of the factfinder.
A. THE FRAGILITY OF DEMEANOR EVIDENCE
The relationship between Elizabeth Bennett and Fitzwilliam Darcy
at the centerpiece of the novel begins badly. The community of which
Elizabeth is a member forms a preliminary judgment about Darcy at the
first ball, after his and Bingley's arrival at Netherfield, and Elizabeth fol-
lows the pack. Austen tells us that Darcy
soon drew the attention of the room by his fine, tall person, handsome
features, noble mien; and the report which was in general circulation
within five minutes after his entrance, of his having ten thousand a
year. The gentlemen pronounced him to be a fine figure of a man, the
ladies declared he was much handsomer than Mr Bingley, and he was
looked at with great admiration for about half the evening, till his
manners gave a disgust which turned the tide of his popularity; for he
was discovered to be proud, to be above his company, and above being
pleased; and not all his large estate in Derbyshire could then save him
terminations of credibility. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1998) (rejecting defen-
dant's contention that Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and the compulsory process clause
guaranteed him the right to offer polygraph evidence); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 68i,
69o-9I (1988) (requiring that trial judge admit prior bad acts evidence so long as some reasonable ju-
ror could conclude that defendant had engaged in that prior conduct); see also McGough, supra note
2 1, at 485.
[T]he first principles of evidence include these assumptions: that accuracy of fact-finding is
optimized by having the court or jury hear live testimony given by every witness under oath;
that requiring eye-to-eye confrontation between adversaries deters perjury; that adversarial
cross-examination reveals the falsities of any account as well as its frailties caused by malice
or bias; that by observing a witness's demeanor while testifying-the body's language of
gestures, twitches, hesitancies, shifts, quiverings, quaverings-the judge or jury can dis-
criminate between truthful and untruthful testimony. Collectively, the Anglo-American
trial mode assumes that accuracy is optimized by having the court or jury hear live testi-
mony by every witness.
[V01. 55:697
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from having a most forbidding, disagreeable countenance, and being
unworthy to be compared with his friend. 3
The "manners" to which the narrator alludes above, which provoke
such an instantaneous reassessment of Darcy, are his refusal to dance or
converse with any of the assembly other than his own party. 4 As a result,
Austen tells us, "[Darcy's] character was decided. He was the proudest,
most disagreeable man in the world, and everybody hoped that he would
never come there again."25 Having already shown us her capacity for
irony, Austen's use of the passive voice invites a response that is contin-
gent on the level of irony which the reader brings to it: A superficial
judge accepts this absolute "decision" as to Darcy's character, while a
reader ready to be engaged as an independent factfinder might suspect
that such a decision is, by its very certitude, suspect.
6
With respect to Elizabeth in particular, Darcy gives special offense,
in a frank conversation with Bingley that Elizabeth is near enough to
overhear. Bingley coaxes Darcy to dance, but he refuses, saying "[a]t
such an assembly as this, it would be insupportable. Your sisters are en-
gaged, and there is not another woman in the room, whom it would not
be a punishment to me to stand up with."27 When Bingley directs Darcy's
attention to Elizabeth, Darcy "coldly" replies, "[s]he is tolerable; but not
23. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 58.
24. Id. Austen contrasts this behavior with that of Bingley, who is described as being "lively and
unreserved, danced every dance, and was angry that the ball closed so early, and talked of giving one
himself at Netherfield." Id.
25. Id.
26. The range of reader responses to such proof parallels those of the central characters. The su-
perficial factfmder is perhaps best exemplified by Mrs. Bennett, who quickly reaches judgments based
upon the most inane of proofs, is slow to reconsider or retract those judgments, and is herself made
ridiculous by such conduct. See id. at 167 (describing Mrs. Bennett's reaction to the news that Mr.
Collins is to wed Charlotte: "In the first place, she persisted in disbelieving the whole of the matter;
secondly, she was very sure that Mr Collins had been taken in; thirdly, she trusted that they would
never be happy together; and fourthly, that the match might be broken off."). A reader like Mrs. Ben-
nett might accept this "decision" about Darcy and, like Mrs. Bennett, be wholly surprised by a reas-
sessment of his character later in the novel. See id. at 386 (Mrs. Bennett's reaction to learning that
Elizabeth was to wed Darcy: "I am so pleased-so happy. Such a charming man! -so handsome! so
tall! -Oh, my dear Lizzy! pray apologize for my having disliked him so much before. I hope he will
overlook it."). Although her assessment is based on more reliable proofs, a more critical factfinder like
Elizabeth is nevertheless deeply affected by her own initial assessment of Darcy. So, a reader like
Elizabeth might want more proof than that offered by Darcy's conduct at the assembly, and might re-
serve certitude until such proof were offered. Jane alone is unwilling to adopt the "decision" of the
community at large, preferring to be guided by a deep presumption as to the goodness of others. See
infra text accompanying notes 63-71. A reader like Jane might maintain a kind of presumption of in-
nocence about Darcy that would likely resist the trivial proof set out above.
This correspondence between reader and character as to factfinding strengths and weaknesses
can also be found between reader and juror.
27. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 59.
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handsome enough to tempt me; and I am in no humor at present to give
consequence to young ladies who are slighted by other men.''2s As a re-
sult of these firsthand, albeit covert, observations, Elizabeth "remained
with no very cordial feelings toward" Darcy.29
The judgments formed by both Elizabeth and the larger community
are predicated on personal observation of Darcy's statements and ac-
companying conduct, including tone, demeanor,30 and gesture. In an ad-
judicatory context, we might label Darcy the declarant.3 Such proof is
given primacy in the Federal Rules through the ban on hearsay,32 and is
generally deemed to be worthy of a factfinder's reliance.33 As is set out
more fully below, however, this preference for firsthand evidence, as
against hearsay, is not supported by the novel. Indeed, it is this very pref-
erence for firsthand evidence over hearsay that drives the narrative by
producing the distorted judgments that must later be unraveled.
Even in the brief passage above, Austen warns us of the deceptively
suasive power of demeanor evidence, by juxtaposing antithetical inter-
pretations of Darcy's appearance and manner to support the shifting
judgments of the community. Darcy is first seen as a "fine figure of a
man," whom "the ladies declared.., was much handsomer than Mr
Bingley," and who "was looked at with great admiration for about half
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. "Demeanor" is said to embrace
the tone of voice in which a witness's statement is made, the hesitation or readiness with
which his answers are given, the look of the witness, his carriage, his evidences of surprise,
his gestures, his zeal, his bearing, his expressions, his yawns, the use of his eyes, his furtive
or meaning glances, or his shrugs, the pitch of his voice, his self-possession or embarrass-
ment, his air of candor or seeming levity.
Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (6th ed. 199o)).
31. Fed. R. Evid. 8oI(b) defines a "declarant" as "a person who makes a statement."
32. Fed. R. Evid. 802 provides that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Con-
gress." Fed. R. Evid. 8oi(c) defines "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
33. Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 334 (961) ("[L]awyers
assume that the ability of the trier [of fact] to assess credibility is greater when he can observe de-
meanor and reaction to cross-examination."). Weinstein goes on to state that "[e]ven if this assump-
tion is not subject to proof by acceptable psychological tests and theory, it is shared by jurors and it
seems to accord with our common experience." Id. at 335 (citing Lawrence S. Kubie, Implications for
Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, IO8 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 72-75 (I959)); see also
Mueller, supra note 17, at 392 ("[b]ecause all agree that live testimony is preferable to remote state-
ments, the preference is self-executing to some extent"). It is this understanding of jurors' "common
experience" that Austen's work amplifies.
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the evening."' But by later that same evening, "not all his large estate in
Derbyshire could then save him from having a most forbidding, dis-
agreeable countenance, and being unworthy to be compared with his
friend."35 Plainly, since Darcy cannot actually have changed in appear-
ance in those few hours, the difference in significance accorded his coun-
tenance by the factfinders of Meryton must be attributable to some other
factor. In this way, Austen flags for the reader the convenient malleabil-
ity of demeanor evidence, and the grave temptation to factfinders of all
levels of skill to construe demeanor as demonstrating a conclusion to
which they are already bound for other reasons. 6 As a literary insight,
this use of irony gives pleasure to the reader, and as a legal insight it
demonstrates a sophistication that has often eluded lawyers, legislators,
and judges.
Perhaps the most significant evidence in Elizabeth's adjudication of
Darcy's character is the information that she learns, firsthand, from Mr.
Wickham, a newly commissioned officer in the regiment stationed at
Meryton. Although their acquaintance is very slight, Wickham details to
Elizabeth his past connection to Darcy, telling her that he has "no reason
for avoiding [Darcy] but what I might proclaim to all the world; a sense
of very great ill usage, and most painful regrets at his being what he is."37
Wickham continues that he
can never be in company with this Mr Darcy without being grieved to
the soul by a thousand tender recollections. His behavior to myself has
been scandalous; but I verily believe I could forgive him any thing and
every thing, rather than his disappointing the hopes and disgracing the
memory of his father. 35
Wickham then recounts to Elizabeth events in his own past that led
him into military life, claiming to have been denied by Darcy the living of
a parish that the elder Mr. Darcy had bequeathed him.39
Elizabeth, who prides herself on her own skill in assessing character,
is taken in.4" By the conclusion of Wickham's narrative she has reached
her verdict on Darcy:
34. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 58.
35. Id.
36. See Wellborn, supra note 21, at io78-88 (summarizing studies that purport to identify those
traits that are reliable predictors of veracity).
37. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 122.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 122-23.
40. Elizabeth laments later when Darcy reveals her errors:
"How despicably have I acted!" she cried.-"I, who have prided myself on my discern-
ment!-I, who have valued myself on my abilities! who have often disdained the generous
candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in useless or blameable distrust.... Had I
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I had not thought Mr Darcy so bad as this-though I have never liked
him, I had not thought so very ill of him-I had supposed him to be de-
spising his fellow-creatures in general, but did not suspect him of de-
scending to such malicious revenge, such injustice, such inhumanity as
this!4'
Her conclusions are based upon her assessment of everything that
the rules suggest is central to weighing credibility: it is just that she gets it
all wrong."
Elizabeth consistently affirms her judgments of Wickham's and
Darcy's relative worth by reference to their demeanors. She muses, dur-
ing Wickham's narrative, "[a] young man, too, like you, whose very
countenance may vouch for your being amiable."43 When she recounts
Wickham's tale to Jane, she says "there was truth in his looks."'  And
later, when she learns of Darcy's version of events, she reflects that "[a]s
to [Wickham's] real character, had information been in her power, she
had never felt a wish of enquiring. His countenance, voice, and manner,
had established him at once in the possession of every virtue."'4 Just as
contemporary social science concludes, her capacity to draw inferences
about credibility from these superficial observations is very poor.46
been in love, I could not have been more wretchedly blind. But vanity, not love, has been
my folly."
Id. at 236. Elizabeth's attitude in this respect is part of the "pride" adverted to in the novel's title.
41. Id. at 123-24.
42. Elizabeth's interview with Wickham allows her free range for cross-examination, and she
takes advantage of it, peppering Wickham with questions throughout his narrative. Id. at 123-25
("[Blut how could that be?-How could his will be disregarded?-Why did you not seek legal re-
dress?"); id. at 123 ("'But what,' said she, after a pause, 'can have been his motive?-what can have
induced him to behave so cruelly?"'); id. at 125 ("Can such an abominable pride as his have ever done
him good?"); id. ("What sort of a girl is Miss Darcy?"); id. ("How can Mr Bingley, who seems good
humour itself, and is, I really believe, truly amiable, be in friendship with such a man? How can they
suit each other?-Do you know Mr Bingley?"). Indeed, her probing questions suggest that she is per-
haps more like a juror than the ordinary factfinder. See Mueller, supra note 17, at 407 n.s 19 ("[T]he
trial process invites testing and probing that people do not pursue in their daily lives, particularly
where the matters under discussion do not directly affect them.").
43. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 124.
44. Id. at 128.
45. Id. at 234. Aunt Gardiner, who in some ways stands for trustworthiness or good judgment,
falls victim to this same set of assessment tools, saying of Darcy:
I really should not have thought that he could have behaved in so cruel a way by any body,
as he has done by poor Wickham. He has not an ill-natured look. On the contrary, there is
something pleasing about his mouth when he speaks. And there is something of dignity in
his countenance, that would not give one an unfavorable idea of his heart.
Id. at 278.
46. Social science research has confirmed the tendency, to which Austen alludes here, of people
to treat those who are physically attractive better than those who are less so, in assessing not only their
credibility but also their culpability. See Michael G. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the
Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated
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Elizabeth's failure to expose Wickham's deceit in this encounter, de-
spite the opportunity to examine his testimonial capacities, suggests that
the contemporary confidence in the capacity of jurors to act as "lie detec-
tors" is misplaced. Indeed, when at last the truth is revealed to Elizabeth,
she realizes, in hindsight, how inappropriate it was of Wickham to have
disclosed such intimate facts about his relation with the Darcy family on
so slight an acquaintance with her. Austen explains:
She was now struck with the impropriety of such communications to a
stranger and wondered it had escaped her before. She saw the indeli-
cacy of putting himself forward as he had done, and the inconsistency
of his profession with his conduct. She remembered that he had
boasted of having no fear of seeing Mr Darcy-that Mr Darcy might
leave the country but that he should stand his ground; yet he had
avoided the Netherfield ball the very next week.47
This breach of decorum should have been a clue for Elizabeth as
factfinder, but her reliance on demeanor (Wickham's charm) undercuts
her capacity to apply such assessment tools to reveal bias on the witness's
part.48
In the analogy between this quotidian factfinding and the adjudica-
tory factfinding of a jury, one flaw noted by those evidence scholars at-
tempting to apply controlled experiments on lie detection to the trial
process is absent. It has been observed that such controlled studies can
never accurately gauge jurors' capacity to identify truthful witnesses be-
cause experimental subjects lack a sufficient motivation to be perceived
as truthful, whereas testifying witnesses often possess such motivation.49
Jury Task, 8 J. RES. PERSONALITY 45, 45 (1974); Harold Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Danger-
ous: Effects of Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 410, 410 (1975) (finding that both men and women are more likely to give lenient
treatment to attractive defendants), cited in Marder, Note, supra note 13, at 594 n.5. There is, however,
empirical support for the proposition that attractiveness of a witness does not affect credibility except
where the factfinder is "not highly motivated." Mueller, supra note 17, at 379 ("[mlotivation appar-
ently affects the ability to evaluate conflicting evidence and to overcome distractions from affective
reactions and the way evidence is packaged") (citing RICHARD E. PErrY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMU-
NICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES To ATITUDE 205 (1986)).
47. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 235.
48. More cynically, the recognition of jurors' incapacity to discern truthspeakers from liars has
been described as an open secret. See Fisher, supra note 21, at 7o6-07 (suggesting that the "inexorable
flow of factfinding power to the jury was due, finally, to the jury's capacity to erase all blemishes" and
that the "black box" of jury deliberations "serves as the great procedural opiate, which draws the cur-
tain upon human errors and soothes us in the assurance that we have attained the unattainable")
(quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 262 (1920)).
49. See Fisher, supra note 21, at 707 n.6o6 (noting that a "far greater flaw of these studies is that
they fail to replicate with any realism the trial witness's intense interest in being believed") (citing
Mark Gregory Frank, Human Lie Detection Ability as a Function of the Liar's Motivation t (1989)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University)).
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Here, in narrating his mistreatment at the hands of Darcy, Wickham
seems every bit as motivated as the witness in a serious civil or criminal
case might be. Perhaps this factor, rather than Wickham's good looks or
Elizabeth's own qualities as a factfinder, tips the balance in her percep-
tion of the truth of those past events.
As for Jane, her feelings for Bingley are genuine and strong from
their first meeting, and her impression of his feelings for her is that they
are of the same kind. Both Jane and Bingley, as factfinders, rely on their
own perceptions of the demeanor cues of their counterparts, and both
are right." Nevertheless, each is persuaded by the influence of others that
his or her own judgments are without foundation. Thus, Austen poses a
counterpoint to Elizabeth and Darcy's errors by showing that demeanor
cues can sometimes be read correctly, yet the reader of such cues can
nevertheless err in her factfinding by refusing to value her own percep-
tions as against those of others.
Darcy-with his own bias against the Bennett family in full play-
assures Bingley that Jane has no feelings for him. But, like Jane, rather
than relying on his own observations of Jane's demeanor, Bingley
chooses to credit Darcy and his sister, Caroline, and so does not pursue
Jane for many months. As Darcy later explains to Elizabeth, "[Bingley]
had before believed [Jane] to return his affection with sincere, if not with
equal regard. - But Bingley has great natural modesty, with a stronger
dependence on my judgment than on his own.-To convince him, there-
fore, that he had deceived himself, was no very difficult point."'" Bingley
is, according to Darcy, "most unaffectedly modest. His diffidence had
prevented his depending on his own judgment in so anxious a case, but
his reliance on mine, made everything easy.
52
Conversely, Darcy is, like Elizabeth, all certainty in his judgments
when he writes to Elizabeth that
50. As to the accuracy of Bingley's and Jane's perceptions, it was amply corroborated by the per-
ceptions of others. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 227-28 (Darcy explaining that he "had not been long in
Hertfordshire, before I saw, in common with others, that Bingley preferred your eldest sister, to any
other young woman in the country," and describing the degree of Bingley's attachment to Jane as a
"partiality... beyond what I had ever witnessed in him"). Darcy also tells Elizabeth that "[alt th[e
Netherfield] ball, while I had the honour of dancing with you, I was first made acquainted, by Sir Wil-
liam Lucas's accidental information, that Bingley's attentions to your sister had given rise to a general
expectation of their marriage. He spoke of it as a certain event, of which the time alone could be unde-
cided." Id.
51. Id. at 229. Perhaps it is no more than the ordinary self-doubt of a lover wondering whether his
feelings are returned by his object, but perhaps it is a trait of character, as described below, that fun-
damentally affects his capacity as a factfinder.
52. Id. at 379 (Darcy to Elizabeth after Jane and Bingley, and Elizabeth and Darcy, have become
engaged).
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I had not been long in Hertfordshire, before I saw, in common with
others, that Bingley preferred your eldest sister, to any other young
woman in the country.-But it was not till the evening of the dance at
Netherfield that I had any apprehension of his feeling a serious at-
tachment.-I had often seen him in love before.... I observed my
friend's behaviour attentively; and I could then perceive that his parti-
ality for Miss Bennett was beyond what I had ever witnessed in him.
Your sister I also watched.-Her look and manners were open, cheer-
ful and engaging as ever, but without any symptom of peculiar regard,
and I remained convinced from the evening's scrutiny, that though she
received his attentions with pleasure, she did not invite them by any
participation of sentiment.53
Darcy reaffirms his belief when he confesses his machinations in
"pointing out" the "certain evils" of a match with Jane, saying, "I do not
suppose that it would ultimately have prevented the marriage, had it not
been seconded by the assurance which I hesitated not in giving, of your
sister's indifference."'
Indeed, Darcy persists until the very end of the novel that he did not
believe Jane to be attached to Bingley, grudgingly acknowledging that he
was wrong, although never recognizing that his own bias against the
match probably distorted his perception of Jane's (and Bingley's) de-
meanors. 5  But for Bingley, Jane is the out-of-court declarant and Darcy
53. Id. at 227-28. As Darcy continues, even his effort to acknowledge that he might be in error is
padded with swagger, "If you have not been mistaken here, I must have been in an error. Your supe-
rior knowledge of your sister must make the latter probable.-If it be so, if I have been misled by such
error, to inflict pain on her, your resentment has not been unreasonable. But I shall not scruple to as-
sert, that the serenity of your sister's countenance and air was such as might have given the most acute
observer, a conviction that, however amiable her temper, her heart was not likely to be easily
touched." Id.
54. Id. at 229.
55. Demonstrating some of his pride and prejudice, Darcy refuses even to acknowledge that he
could be biased in his perceptions, let alone that he was on that occasion. Id. at 228 ("That I was desir-
ous of believing her indifferent is certain,-but I will venture to say that my investigations and deci-
sions are not usually influenced by my hopes or fears.-I did not believe her to be indifferent because
I wished it;-I believed it on impartial conviction, as truly as I wished it in reason.") And when Darcy
says of Jane and Bingley's engagement that he was not surprised, but rather felt "that it would soon
happen," Elizabeth teasingly replies: "That is to say, you had given your permission." Austen adds:
"And though he exclaimed at the term; she found that it had been pretty much the case." Id. at 379.
Darcy confesses that
"On the evening before my going to London," said he, "I made a confession to [Bingley],
which I believe I ought to have made long ago. I told him of all that had occurred to make
my former interference in his affairs, absurd and impertinent. His surprise was great. He
had never had the slightest suspicion. I told him, moreover, that I believed myself mistaken
in supposing, as I had done, that your sister was indifferent to him; and as I could easily per-
ceive that his attachment to her was unabated, I felt no doubt of their happiness together."
Id. Indeed, even at the novel's close, Darcy continues to be excessively confident of his own judgment
as to Jane's demeanor, relying on it over and above Elizabeth's far deeper knowledge of her sister.
When Elizabeth asks Darcy, "Did you speak from your own observation ... when you told him that
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is the testifying witness, and Bingley's reliance on the hearsay proves
unwarranted and, for a time, costly.
B. THE ROLE OF CERTAINTY AND SIMPLICITY IN ASSESSING
DEMEANOR EVIDENCE
Although our adjudicatory rules presume that it is the nature of the
evidence itself-hearsay or not-that determines the validity of the judg-
ment reached by a factfinder, Austen's conclusions in this area are quite
different. For Austen, the nature of the evidence does not determine the
likelihood of an accurate judgment. Instead, Austen suggests that there
are variables associated with the factfinder that make evidence reliable
or misleading, irrespective of its hearsay nature. These variables seem to
be the certitude and the essential simplicity of the factfinder.
As these two plot strands involving Jane and Elizabeth unravel, it
appears, somewhat counterintuitively, that the probability of error result-
ing from reliance on demeanor evidence increases with the factfinder's
certitude as to her own skill." Where Elizabeth is fixed in her conclusions
as to Darcy, based on personal interviews with both him and Wickham,
Jane and Bingley are deceived not by their own assessment of the others'
demeanor, but by reliance on hearsay-the statements of people other
than the declarant offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein-
that contradicts their own impressions of each other.57 These naives defer
to the judgments of others-the testifying witnesses, in this construc-
tion-rather than relying on their own capacities to observe and judge
one another's feelings.
Where Elizabeth is certain as to Wickham's and Darcy's natures,
Jane's assessment of the character and conduct of others, including Bing-
ley's regard for her, is tentative and dubious. This apposition is well illus-
trated during the intimate conversation between the sisters, when
my sister loved him, or merely from my information last spring?," he replies, "From the former. I had
narrowly observed her during the two visits which I had lately made her here; and I was convinced of
her affection." Id. at 379. Elizabeth uses the word "merely" to describe and discount her own account
of Jane's feelings, unless Austen intends this to be another in a series of ironic tweaks of Darcy's arro-
gance in which Elizabeth indulges in this scene.
56. The confident Elizabeth may be more like the typical juror than the tentative Jane. See
Fisher, supra note 21, at 706 ("Not only do experimental subjects rarely perform much better than
chance at distinguishing truth from falsehood, but they think they are better lie detectors than they
are.") (citing Wellborn, supra note 21, at io82-88 (summarizing studies)).
57. This compatibility is, ultimately, one of the strengths of their relationship. As Elizabeth ob-
serves when at last Bingley and Jane are engaged, she "really believed all his expectations of felicity,
to be rationally founded, because they had for basis the excellent understanding, and super-excellent
disposition of Jane, and a general similarity of feeling and taste between her and himself." AUSTEN,
supra note 7, at 357.
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Elizabeth tells Jane of her conversation with Wickham. Jane says, "It is
difficult indeed-it is distressing. -One does not know what to think."
Elizabeth immediately replies: "I beg your pardon;-one knows exactly
what to think.""5 Hers is a certitude that borders on arrogance, and Aus-
ten's title suggests it is rooted in pride and operates so automatically and
absolutely as to amount to prejudice.
It is only at the close of the novel, when she tells her father of her
engagement to Darcy and he responds with great surprise and concern,59
that Elizabeth chides herself for this certitude, and for the excessive
freedom she had shown in expressing her strong opinions:
How earnestly did she then wish that her former opinions had been
more reasonable, her expressions more moderate! It would have
spared her from explanations and professions which it was exceedingly
awkward to give; but they were not necessary, and she assured him
with some confusion, of her attachment to Mr Darcy.60
Jane, by contrast, consistently dismisses her own perceptions of
Bingley's regard as inaccurate right up until the novel's close. As late as
chapter fifty-four, when Bingley finally returns to the neighborhood of
Meryton and meets Jane after a long absence, she tells Elizabeth: "I have
now learnt to enjoy his conversation as an agreeable and sensible young
man, without having a wish beyond it. I am perfectly satisfied from what
his manners now are, that he never had any design of engaging my affec-
tion.",6' When Elizabeth presses her and teases her about the inaccuracy
of those impressions, she replies: "How hard it is in some cases to be be-
lieved!'62
This contrast in character between Elizabeth and Jane is drawn with
consistency throughout the novel, and is duplicated in the brotherly
friendship between Darcy and Bingley. It signals a corresponding differ-
ence in approach to factfinding that may be of more use in developing
58. Id. at 129. This certainty is a quality which Darcy notes early on and which becomes the sub-
ject of some teasing. While visiting with the Bingleys during Jane's illness, Elizabeth says to Darcy,
"[W]e are each of an unsocial, taciturn disposition, unwilling to speak, unless we expect to say some-
thing that will amaze the whole room, and be handed down to posterity with all the eclat of a prov-
erb." Darcy replies, "This is no very striking resemblance of your own character, I am sure," said he.
"How near it may be to mine, I cannot pretend to say.-You think it a faithful portrait undoubtedly."
Id. at 134.
59. Id. at 384 ("Her father was walking about the room, looking grave and anxious. 'Lizzy,' said
he, 'what are you doing? Are you out of your senses, to be accepting this man? Have not you always
hated him?"').
60. Id.
6I. Id. at 352.
62. Id. at 353.
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rules of evidence than the present emphasis on demeanor and bias
against hearsay.
The second variable upon which the probability of an erroneous
judgment seems to turn for Austen is the essential simplicity or cynicism
of the factfinder. Where Elizabeth is eager to root out unkindness or du-
plicity, and is correspondingly deceived in her judgments of Wickham
and Darcy, Jane and Bingley are each predisposed to take people as they
find them but are, ironically, less likely to be governed by their own im-
pressions, even where they are accurate. For instance, when Elizabeth
learns that Bingley is settled in London and is not returning to court her
sister, the narrator observes:
That he was really fond of Jane, she [Elizabeth] doubted no more than
she had ever done; and as much as she had always been disposed to
him, she could not think without anger, hardly without contempt, on
that easiness of temper, that want of proper resolution, which now
made him the slave of his designing friends, and led him to sacrifice his
own happiness to the caprice of their iclnations.
Austen juxtaposes Elizabeth's nature with that of Jane in this re-
spect, when the sisters converse about Jane's disappointment. Jane be-
gins:
"I have this comfort immediately, that it has not been more than an er-
ror of fancy on my side, and that it has done no harm to anyone but
myself."
"My dear Jane," exclaimed Elizabeth, "you are too good. Your
sweetness and disinterestedness are really angelic; I do not know what
to say to you. I feel as if I had never done you justice, or loved you as
you deserve."
Miss Bennett eagerly disclaimed all extraordinary merit, and threw
back the praise on her sister's warm affection.
"Nay," said Elizabeth, "this is not fair." You wish to think all the
world respectable, and are hurt if I speak ill of anybody. I only want to
think you perfect, and you set yourself against it.... There are few
people whom I really love, and still fewer of whom I think well. The
more I see of the world, the more I am dissatisfied with it; and every
day confirms my belief of the inconsistency of all human characters,
and of the little dependence that can be placed on the appearance of
either merit or sense."
64
63. Id. at 172. So condemnatory is Elizabeth, by contrast, that she is able to see Bingley's good-
ness as flaw in itself, as to which she cannot "think without anger." Id.
64. Id. at 173-74.
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Accordingly, as wrong as she is about Wickham and Darcy, it is
Elizabeth who recognizes Caroline Bingley as a schemer plotting to se-
cure her brother a better connection than Jane Bennett.
Jane, by contrast, can see no guile or bias in Miss Bingley's letter,
and doubts, instead, her own impressions of Bingley's feelings for her.
She tells her sister:
"Beyond a doubt, they do wish him to chuse Miss Darcy," replied Jane;
"but this may be from better feelings than you are supposing. They
have known her much longer than they have known me; no wonder if
they love her better. But, whatever may be their own wishes, it is very
unlikely they should have opposed their brother's. What sister would
think herself at liberty to do it, unless there were something very objec-
tionable? If they believed him attached to me, they would not try to
part us; if he were so, they could not succeed. By supposing such an af-
fection, you make every body acting unnaturally and wrong, and me
most unhappy. Do not distress me by the idea. I am not ashamed of
having been mistaken-or, at least, it is slight, it is nothing in compari-
son of what I should feel in thinking ill of him or his sisters. Let me
take it in the best light, in the light in which it may be understood."
65
Even when Jane does come to see Miss Bingley in a different light,
she attributes it to a change in Miss Bingley, rather than in her own ca-
pacity to see negative qualities in others. She writes to Elizabeth from
London, "I confess myself to have been entirely deceived in Miss Bing-
ley's regard for me. But, my dear sister, though the event has proved you
right, do not think me obstinate if I still assert, that, considering what her
behaviour was, my confidence was as natural as your suspicion." 66 She
describes Miss Bingley as "in every respect so altered a creature" from
her early behavior, and tentatively suggests, "I cannot understand it. If I
were not afraid of judging harshly, I should almost be tempted to say,
that there is strong appearance of duplicity in all this."67
Elizabeth condemns Darcy, while Jane
was the only creature who could suppose there might be any extenuat-
ing circumstances in the case, unknown to the society of Hertfordshire;
her mild and steady candor always pleaded for allowances, and urged
the possibility of mistakes-but by everybody else Mr Darcy was con-
demned as the worst of men.68
65. Id. at 175.
66. Id. at 184.
67. Id. at 184-85.
68. Id. at 176.
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Similarly, when Jane is told of Wickham's story,
she knew not how to believe that Mr Darcy could be sounworthy of
Mr Bingley's regard; and yet, it was not in her nature to question the
veracity of a young man of such amiable appearance as Wickham.-
The possibility of his having really endured such unkindness, was
enough to interest all her tender feelings; and nothing therefore re-
mained to be done, but to think well of them both, to defend the con-
duct of each, and throw into the account of accident or mistake,
whatever could not be otherwise explained. 69
Later, when Jane learns of Wickham's past misdeeds, she again re-
sists condemning him. Austen writes:
What a stroke was this for poor Jane! who would willingly have gone
through the world without believing that so much wickedness existed
in the whole race of mankind, as was here collected in one individual.
Nor was Darcy's vindication, though grateful to her feelings, capable of
consoling her for such discovery. Most earnestly did she labour to
prove theprobability of error, and seek to clear one, without involving
the other.'
Finally, when Lydia runs off with Wickham, Jane again resists pass-
ing judgment. "'But you see that Jane,' said her aunt, 'does not think so
ill of Wickham, as to believe him capable of the attempt.' 'Of whom does
Jane ever think ill?.' replies Elizabeth."
As is set out more fully above,72 the characters of Darcy and Bingley
are placed in a counterpoint similar to that between Elizabeth and Jane.
Austen explains that between Bingley and Darcy
there was a very steady friendship, in spite of a great opposition of
character.-Bingley was endeared to Darcy by the easiness, openness,
ductility of his temper, though no disposition could offer a greater con-
trast to his own, and though with his own he never appeared dissatis-
fied.73
Darcy is as confident of his judgments as Elizabeth, conceding only
at the end of the novel that he might have been wrong about Jane's feel-
ings for Bingley. At one point early in the novel, he brags to Elizabeth
that
I have faults enough, but they are not, I hope, of understanding. My
temper I dare not vouch for.-It is I believe too little yielding-
69. Id. at 128. Here Jane not only judges this hearsay report by her own simplicity of nature but is
ready to defer to Bingley's judgment of Darcy's character as a proxy for the truth.
70. Id. at 251.
71. Id. at 3oo-o.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57 (describing Darcy's overconfidence in his own judg-
ment and Bingley's willingness to defer to the judgment of others).
73. Id. at 64.
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certainly too little for the convenience of the world. I cannot forget the
follies and vices of others so soon as I ought, nor their offences against
myself.... My good opinion once lost is lost for ever.74
Like Elizabeth's, his certitude is to be an obstacle to the accurate as-
sessment of others, including Elizabeth, Jane, and Bingley.
C. THE UNEXPECTED RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY
It is not until the second half of the novel that Elizabeth allows the
opinions and reports of others, i.e., hearsay, to unseat her own factual de-
terminations about both men.75 For Austen, hearsay is, on significant oc-
casions, not merely the equivalent of firsthand testimony, but even its
superior for accuracy and reliability. It has particular reliability where
the factfinder is, like Elizabeth and Darcy, overconfident to the point of
prejudice. And yet, at the same time it poses particular dangers to a fact-
finder who, like Jane, is easily swayed by the opinions of others. Just as
hearsay reveals Elizabeth's errors in assessment of demeanor and ad-
vances the goal of truthseeking as to Darcy and Wickham's natures, it is
also the undoing of Jane and Bingley's correctly intuited judgments of
,6each other.7 Austen, then, recognizes the pitfalls of hearsay testimony.
It is Miss Bingley's letter to Jane that persuades Jane that Bingley
has no feelings for her. Miss Bingley is engaged in purposeful distortion
when she writes to Jane that
My brother admires [Georgiana Darcy] greatly already; he will have
frequent opportunity now of seeing her on the most intimate footing;
her relations all wish the connection as much as his own; and a sister's
74. Id. at io2.
75. Elizabeth's reassessment of each man begins with Darcy's letter to her following her refusal of
his first marriage proposal, id. at 227-32, and is later supplemented by the testimonies of others, in-
cluding the housekeeper at Pemberly, id. at 269-72, and her own sister Jane. After leaving Pemberly,
Elisabeth's thoughts were described in this manner:
The respect created by the conviction of his [Darcy's) valuable qualities, though at first un-
willingly admitted, had for some time ceased to be repugnant to her feelings; and it was now
heightened into somewhat of a friendlier nature, by the testimony so highly in his favour,
and bringing forward his disposition in so amiable a light, which yesterday had produced.
Id. at 284. She is also influenced by her uncle's report of Darcy's conduct in the matter of Lydia and
Wickham's elopement, which conduct includes some statements of Darcy's that would, through Uncle
Gardiner, be hearsay.
The rules of evidence currently in use do recognize reputation as to character-the agglomera-
tion of hearsay that is reported within a recognizable community-as an exception to the usual ban on
hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 803(21). Accordingly, even under current rules, the housekeeper's comments
on Darcy's good character could appropriately be offered.
76. So, Jane is easily dissuaded from her initial confidence in Bingley's feelings for her by the
rank hearsay of his sister's letter after leaving Netherfield, in which Miss Bingley praises Georgiana
Darcy. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 158-59.
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partiality is not misleading me, I think, when I call Charles most capa-
ble of engaging any woman's heart."
Here, Miss Bingley, standing in the role of the testifying witness,
purports to repeat to us the feelings and perceptions of Bingley, the out
of court declarant. s But since Jane has no access to Bingley himself, she
has no way of determining the accuracy of Miss Bingley's report.
We do however, have access to Miss Bingley's bias as well as her
character for credibility. Through Elizabeth, we see the "ladies of Long-
bourn," Caroline and her sister, as "supercilious in their treatment of
every body, hardly excepting even her sister."79 And Elizabeth uses her
own opinion as to Miss Bingley's credibility to dismiss her account of
Bingley's feelings, preferring to rely on her own, accurate, observations
of Bingley himself.
Thus, Austen offers conflicting depictions of what may be done with
hearsay, depending on the character of the factfinder. A credulous or un-
sophisticated factfinder may rely on the hearsay to her detriment, while a
more sophisticated factfinder might reject the evidence as tainted by its
hearsay character and by the credibility or character of the testifying wit-
ness.
One last example reveals Austen's pleasure in manipulating conflict-
ing modes of proof. When Colonel Fitzwilliam, Georgiana Darcy's
cousin and second guardian, is strolling in the park with Elizabeth and
tells her of how Darcy "congratulated himself on having lately saved a
friend from the inconveniences of a most imprudent marriage,"" Eliza-
beth recognizes the account as that of Jane and Bingley, and also recog-
nizes, with anger, the ignoble role that Darcy has played in "destroying
the happiness of a beloved sister."8' Because of her prior knowledge,
Elizabeth is able to see failure where Fitzwilliam sees success, but for
Elizabeth the factfinder, it is Fitzwilliam who is the testifying witness and
Darcy who, as the out-of-court declarant, is in need of a thorough cross-
77. Id. Jane interprets the letter with characteristic credulity, saying to Elizabeth:
Is it not clear enough?-Does it not expressly declare that Caroline [Bingley] neither ex-
pects nor wishes me to be her sister; that she is perfectly convinced of her brother's indiffer-
ence, and that if she suspects the nature of my feelings for him, she means (most kindly!) to
put me on my guard? Can there be any other opinion on the subject?
Id. at 159.
78. The statement of Miss Bingley that her brother "admires" Georgiana "greatly already" im-
plies a communication of some kind from Bingley to his sister, which might be regarded by the Rules
of Evidence as a statement or as conduct intended as a statement, such that it would be within the
reach of the hearsay ban.
79. Id. at 68.
8o. Id. at 217-18.
8i. Id. at 222.
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examination. Fitzwilliam's narrative is full of vagueness and para-
phrases-"there were some very strong objections against the lady," he
says." Elizabeth ably cross-examines Fitzwilliam, filling the gaps with in-
formation to which she has access outside the record, information which
an ordinary juror would not have.
D. APPLYING AUSTEN'S INSIGHTS TO ADJUDICATION
How might jury trials be altered were we to take into account the
variables identified by Austen in Pride and Prejudice when assessing
hearsay as against live testimony? Austen's account would suggest that
the value of these proofs turns not on the differences, catalogued by
scholars, between live testimony and hearsay, or the circumstances sur-
rounding the hearsay statement,'3 but instead on the nature of the fact-
finders who hear and weigh them. For a person of Elizabeth's confident
certitude-even prejudice -demeanor evidence is deceptive, while hear-
say's pitfalls are easily uncovered. Such a factfinder does not require
rules of exclusion to keep her from being the victim of unreliable proofs;
on the contrary, she needs to be told when to relinquish her own confi-
dent conclusions in favor of the judgments of others.8" For an innocent
and tentative factfinder like Jane, the opposite is true-she requires pro-
tection from hearsay because she is not able to sift its distorting possibili-
ties through skeptical faculties. Yet, she makes too little of her own
discernment of character and credibility when it comes to live witnesses,
like Bingley, whose intentions and meanings she read quite accurately
but discarded too quickly.
It is difficult if not impossible to identify factfinders' degree of either
certitude or simplicity, whether prior to, during, or after, the taking of
evidence s5 How then can these variables play any role in the methods
used by courts to treat hearsay or demeanor evidence?
If, as Austen suggests through her novel, the utility of demeanor evi-
dence is inversely related to the certitude of the factfinder, then the pos-
82. Id. at 219.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (catalogue of exceptions to hearsay rule).
84. This is in accord with the model that some evidence scholars envision for hearsay rules. See,
e.g., Weinstein, supra note 33, at 335 (noting that triers of fact feel more assurance that they can arrive
at the truth if they can assess the demeanor of a witness, but that "[a]ssurance of the trier, however,
dictates only a rule of preference, not of exclusion" and that "the risks in using hearsay are exagger-
ated because the trier tends to recognize the difficulty in evaluating the probative force of hearsay and
does not rely heavily upon it when he is aware that it is hearsay").
85. One partial solution might be to encourage or even mandate more probing voir dire of poten-
tial jurors on characteristics that both social science and literature predict have an impact on factfind-




sibility of erroneous assessment is quite a significant one among those,
like Elizabeth Bennett, most likely to be confident in their own ability to
judge. Conversely, if those, like Jane, who are most reluctant to rely on
their own assessments of demeanor are the most likely to be accurate,
then a significant number of factfinders will, in circumstances when their
judgments are sound, nevertheless defer to the erroneous findings of
others. Austen's insights suggest that the accuracy of a factfinder's de-
terminations hinges on qualities, like Jane's simplicity, that are particular
to the factfinder rather than the witness or the proof, and that are impos-
sible to discern except through long knowledge of a person.
If that is correct, then the preferencing of hearsay is not justifiable.
One possible solution would be simply to abandon categorical restric-
tions on hearsay evidence, placing it on a more equal footing with live
testimony. Others have written about the possibility of reworking the
rules regarding hearsay so that they are fundamentally discretionary,
rather than subject to categorical rules of admission or exclusion." Under
86. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 I.I (0987)
(cataloguing the list of "the most severe critics of the traditional hearsay rule's exclusionary principle,
and of categorical exceptions that regulate the admission of hearsay into trials," including Wigmore,
Morgan, McCormick, James, and Weinstein); Weinstein, supra note 33, at 338 ("Apart from the
greater burden on the judges, it would seem desirable to abandon the class exception system and sub-
stitute individual treatment if such a practice were to be combined with advance notice to the oppo-
nent when hearsay was to be introduced. Hearsay would then be admissible when it met the usual
standard for admission of any line of proof-i.e., a reasonable man might be appreciably more satisfied
about the truth or falsity of a material proposition with the evidence than without it."); Roger Park, A
Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 51, 52 (1987) (observing that "the legal
scholars of this century have tended to be supporters of simplification or abolition [of the hearsay rule]
while the practicing bar has tended to defend the rule and tolerates its intricacies," and proposing
broad liberalization of the hearsay rule in civil cases only).
Rule 8o7 (formerly 803(24)), the residual exception, captures the essence of the discretionary ap-
proach, providing that
[a] statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the pro-
ponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 8o7. If the categorical exceptions were eliminated, then they would no longer serve as
reference points for Rule 807's "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," and it would
then be for the court, pursuant to Rule 104(a), to determine whether this open-ended measure of reli-
ability were met. The framers of the Federal Rules originally proposed such a rule of general admissi-
bility, but it proved unacceptable to legislators. See Mueller, supra note 17, at 377 n.35 (citing FED. R.
EVID. 8-o3(a) (Preliminary Draft 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. at 377 (admitting hearsay "if its nature
and the special circumstances under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy")).
At least one commentator has observed that the combined effect of the existing hearsay rule and
its exceptions is that, in the end, most hearsay reaches the factfinder. Irving Younger, Reflections on
the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L. REV. 281, 293 (I98O). While the empirical evidence of this is
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such a regime, hearsay evidence would be assessed by a trial judge using
the traditional criteria of relevance and reliability, unconstrained by
characteristics that, at least by Austen's measure, do not have much im-
pact on the jury's likelihood of misusing that evidence.8' This approach
has certain advantages, such as flexibility, that are missing from the cur-
rent rules' approach. Moreover, it recognizes the range of variables that
shade the question of the reliability of hearsay by allowing the trial judge
to admit hearsay for reasons other than those articulated in the current
list of exceptions.
There is, undoubtedly, a cost to abandoning the categorical excep-
tions approach to the existing hearsay rule, including litigants' interests
in having predictable rules upon which to construct their trial strategies,
and in having judicial discretion constrained to preclude bias.88 Yet the
force of Austen's literary insight is to the effect that the quality of the
source of proof is of less significance in an accurate determination of fact
than other variables unrelated to source. Moreover, Elizabeth Bennett's
facility with the manipulative possibilities of hearsay (as with Miss Bing-
ley's letter to Jane) demonstrates that at least the more savvy juror is
fully capable of assigning the appropriate weight to proof that is from a
hearsay source.
89
In addition, trial courts might incorporate Austen's observation that
certitude is at odds with accurate factfinding, by implementing a kind of
mixed, see Mueller, supra note 17, at 382 n.48 (citing Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It
Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 501-03 (1992) (reporting survey
results that indicated that much hearsay is excluded)); Myrna S. Raeder, A Response to Professor
Swift: The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 507, 514 (1992) (presenting a study in which hearsay was admitted in over half the instances in
which it was offered pursuant to the residual exception), if it proved true then there would be no need
to "repair" the rule.
87. See Park, supra note 86, at 52 (noting that the abandonment over the past century of a variety
of rules of exclusion is based on "the principle, often regarded as virtually self-evident, that it is better
to admit flawed testimony for what it is worth, giving the opponent a chance to expose its defects, than
to take the chance of a miscarriage of justice because the trier is deprived of information").
88. Mueller, supra note 17, at 396-97. Professor Mueller himself provides the rejoinder to these
arguments, noting that the prevention of uncertainty is not alone enough reason to sustain a hearsay
rule since "both the civil and criminal rules permit each side to keep many out-of-court statements
under wraps, so neither side is sure to know what hearsay will be offered." Id. at 396.
89. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 33, at 335 (noting that "the risks in using hearsay are exagger-
ated because the trier tends to recognize the difficulty in evaluating the probative force of hearsay and
does not rely heavily upon it when he is aware that it is hearsay"). The more vulnerable juror, like
Jane, might fall victim to an inappropriate reliance on proof from a hearsay source, but when, as here,
this simplicity is coupled with tentativeness, the combination makes her unlikely to persuade other
jurors to join her in that credulousness.
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preemptive Allen charge,' in which jurors are advised to give due weight
to their own assessment of the evidence, including demeanor evidence of
live witnesses, but are also reminded that the judgments of others,
9o. The term "Allen charge," also known as the "depth charge" or "dynamite charge" for its ef-
fectiveness in "blasting" jury deadlock, see People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 0ooo (Cal. '977), derives
from an 1898 decision, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). In that case, the Supreme Court ap-
proved the giving of an instruction to a deadlocked jury that was,
"in substance," that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected;
that although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acqui-
escence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted
with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it
was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger num-
ber were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reason-
able one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men [sic], equally honest,
equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the
minority ought to ask themselves whether they had might not reasonably doubt the correct-
ness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 5oi.
This charge is controversial coming, as it ordinarily does, during jury deliberations. Indeed, three
circuits of the U.S. Court of Appeals and twenty-two states do not allow it at that stage. See Gainer,
566 P.2d at 1000, 1002-03 (prohibiting such a charge in California "[b]ecause it instructs the jury to
consider extraneous and improper factors, inaccurately states the law, carries a potentially coercive
impact, and burdens rather than facilitates the administration of justice"); id. at n.8 (citing state cases).
See also Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the "Allen Charge", 31 U. Cii.
L. REV. 386, 388 (1964). The American Bar Association recommends against giving such an instruc-
tion, instead approving an instruction "that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere pur-
pose of returning a verdict." ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Re-
lating to Trial by Jury (Tentative Draft 1968), § 5.4(a)(v). Kalven and Zeisel suggest that the
instruction is almost never given to American juries, see Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 13, at 453-55,
although anecdotal evidence is to the contrary. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 234-35
(1988), affirming capital sentence despite trial judge's instruction to jury on second day of delibera-
tions that
[e]ach of you must decide the case for yourself but only after discussion and impartial con-
sideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You are not advocates for one side or the
other. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if you are
convinced you are wrong but do not surrender your honest belief as to the weight and effect
of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
Id. at 235.
Such an instruction, if given prior to the initiation of deliberations, might address much of the
criticism leveled at it as a deadlock-breaker. It would not fall afoul of the concern that juries not con-
sider extraneous materials, since it would be part of the regular charge, with no greater weight than
any other instruction on law or the deliberation process; it would not, as it does during deliberations,
encroach upon the right of a defendant (in a criminal case) to a unanimous verdict, since it would be
given to the entire jury before any could be identified as a holdout or minority; and as part of the
package of instructions, it would have little, if any, coercive aspect. Moreover, the rules governing the
timing of jury instructions are sufficiently open-ended to permit such an instruction prior to the start of
deliberations. See FED. R. CIv. P. 51 (permitting trial judge to "instruct the jury before or after argu-
ment, or both"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 ("The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments
are completed, or at both times.").
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though different, are equally sound. As the Supreme Court observed
about such an instruction when given during deliberations:
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opin-
ion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may
not be changed by conference in the jury-room. The very object of the
jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by ar-
guments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law
that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and
with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the
jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It
cannot be that each juror should go to the jury-room with a blind de-
termination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the case as
that moment; or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of men
who are equally honest and intelligent as himself.9
If, as Austen suggests, there are some jurors who are at risk of per-
sisting in misjudgments of demeanor and of credibility in general, there is
little cost in instructing them to be more open-minded.
At the same time, those who are too deferential could benefit from a
judicial pep-talk as to the reliability of their own, sometimes more accu-
rate, findings. What the Allen charge does for those too strongly bound
to their own views in the face of opposition, a complementary instruction
might do for those too weak, encouraging tentative factfinders (those
who, according to Austen, are more likely to be accurate in their deter-
minations of credibility and fact) to stick to their guns.92 The requirement
of unanimity could perhaps be explicated for jurors, as a mechanism de-
signed to support the minority juror against the majoritarian pressure in-
herent in group dynamics.93 Such an instruction would strengthen the
91. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02.
92. See, e.g., Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 235 (instructing as follows: "Do not hesitate to reexamine
your own views and to change your opinion if you are convinced you are wrong but do not surrender
your honest belief as to the weight and effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow
jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.") (emphasis added).
93. Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, And So Say Some of Us... What to Do When
Jurors Disagree, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 429, 44o (2ooo) (noting that "after initial votes are taken,
jurors in the minority coalition are often the objects of hostility and impatience") (citing Charles
Nemeth, Interaction between Jurors of Majority vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 38, 38-56 0977)). See generally SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHITSMAN, THE AMERICAN
JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1988).
Much has been written about the continued validity of a rule of unanimity, and arguments have
been made to abandon that rule. See, e.g., Schwartz & Schwartz, supra, at 438 (arguing that unanimous
verdict rule is "the most extreme form of minority rule") (citing CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS As-
SOCIATION, NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS: A NECESSARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 52 (1995) (un-
published position paper on file with author) (citing a California poll in favor of adopting a rule
allowing 10-2 verdicts)). It is nevertheless a well-established aspect of our adjudicatory system and its
pedigree and longevity suggest that we do value the procedural and substantive consequences of such
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resolve of tentative but perhaps accurate factfinders as against the force
of their overconfident but mistaken colleagues and might produce more
accurate adjudications.
II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE: PROPENSITY AS PROOF
Another traditionally sacrosanct area of evidence rules is that of
propensity. Generally speaking, jurors are forbidden from using evidence
of a person's character or a trait of character to support an inference that
a person acted "in conformity therewith on a particular occasion."94 Ac-
cording to these rules, it would be improper to attempt to judge the truth
of an event based upon one's assessment of an individuals' character, as
demonstrated through his conduct in other past events.95 Yet, in our quo-
tidian factfinding, such character evidence and inferences therefrom form
the basis of many a judgment and conclusion.
96
a rule, including its production of thorough deliberations, and its role in underscoring the legitimacy of
resulting verdicts.
94. FED. R. EvIo. 404(a).
95. This rule has been essentially abandoned, at least insofar as sexual assaults are concerned.
Rules 413, 414, and 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted as part of the 1994 Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, io8 Stat. 1796 (994), permit the admission
of prior bad acts evidence on "any matter to which it is relevant." See Eleanor Swift, One Hundred
Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer's Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437, 2469 (2000) (noting that
Rules 413-15 "thus abolish, at least with regard to these two types of crimes [rape and sexual assault
on a child], the existing bright-line rules that prohibit the prosecution's use of a criminal defendant's
character to prove conduct").
This standard of broad admissibility trumps that set out in Fed. R. Evid. 404, and makes such evi-
dence subject only to the general discretionary exclusion of Rule 403. See, e.g., United States v. Le-
May, 260 F.3d ioi8, io22 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 414 "is not a blank check entitling the
government to introduce whatever evidence it wishes, no matter how minimally relevant and poten-
tially devastating to the defendant," but is instead subject to Rule 403).
Moreover, some scholars argue that, even in areas outside of sexual assault, the propensity ban
has been eviscerated by judicial exercise of discretion to admit prior acts evidence pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b), ostensibly for purposes other than to prove character. See Swift, supra note 95, at 2469
("Many commentators believe that trial courts are already admitting character-to-conduct evidence
against criminal defendants on their own, in cases quite apart from Rules 413 through 415.").
96. See, e.g., Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 45
EMORY L.J. 221, 222 (1996) (observing that "[a]ll of us engage in 'character reasoning' in our daily
lives. We want to know whether someone will prove to be a good or poor spouse, an easy or hard
grader, a good or bad friend, or a supportive or indifferent colleague.... In light of our own approach
in assessing the behavior of others, it is no wonder that, to many of us, this prohibition defies common
sense."). Indeed, it is perhaps because quotidian factfinding relies so heavily on propensity inferences
that the prohibition has been erected. See Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 519
(1992) (contending that the propensity ban is proper in rape cases since "[t]he danger with such evi-
dence is not that it proves so little, but that it may prove too much"). The willingness of jurors to de-
termine the truth of a particular event through conclusions about character and inferences therefrom
poses too grave a risk of inaccuracy.
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Jane Austen's use of character evidence reflects this intuitive reli-
ance. Indeed, it can hardly be otherwise given that a novelist's success in
general depends to no small degree on an ability to draw characters
whose "truth" or verisimilitude derives from their consistent adherence
to certain traits, or whose characters undergo some transformation from
one recognizable set of behaviors to another.97 Austen follows this pat-
tern, relying heavily on both the perceptibility and predictability of traits
of character to construct her plot and shape her meaning." In Pride and
Prejudice, she depicts a world of human relations in which one need only
determine how another has conducted himself in the past in order to
gauge his worth in the present or his reliability in the future. In this way,
then, Austen casts herself with the trait theorists," fully repudiating any
ban on propensity evidence for her factfinders, whether they are the
characters themselves or the readers to whom Austen presents them.
Indeed, much of the unraveling of error comes from recognition of
the indelibility of certain characters' traits. As with hearsay, discussed
above, these realizations unseat erroneous judgments based upon de-
meanor evidence, demonstrating from another perspective that our con-
fidence in our own assessments of character ought to yield to the
accretion of understanding of character over time by the community as a
whole. So, Elizabeth learns, in a letter from Darcy, that Wickham is a
rogue-that is, that he has engaged in conduct (eloping with Georgiana
97. See, e.g., FORSTER, supra note i, at 70-71 ("The novelist, unlike many of his colleagues, makes
up a number of word-masses roughly describing himself (roughly: niceties shall come later), gives them
names and sex, assigns them plausible gestures, and causes them to speak by the use of inverted com-
mas, and perhaps to behave consistently."); FRYE, supra note 3, at 304-o5 ("The essential difference
between novel and romance lies in the conception of characterization. The romancer does not attempt
to create 'real people' so much as stylized figures which expand into psychological archetypes.... The
novelist deals with personality, with characters wearing their personae or social masks.").
98. As Professor White puts it in his essay on Emma:
[F]or Jane Austen, [language and character] are one; at least they are different aspects of
the same unity. She has no notion of a self untouched by its conduct or of a mind or heart
divorced from its expressions. In speech and behavior that character is at once expressed
and determined. No sharp line separates the self from deed and word, and what a person
says or does is a manifestation of character as directly continuous with the self as if it were
made of the same tissue: the language is the mind.
White, supra note 16, at 184.
99. See Mendez, supra note 96, at 227 (noting that "trait theorists came to believe that traits 'are
relatively stable and enduring predispositions' which exert sufficient influence to produce generally
consistent behavior across widely divergent situations") (quoting WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALrrY AND
ASSESSMENT 6 (1968)). Mendez writes elsewhere that, contrary to the assumptions of these trait theo-
rists, "research conducted for much of this century showed that behavior is largely shaped by specific
situational determinants that do not lend themselves easily to predictions about individual behavior."
Miguel A. Mendez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: "People Do Not Seem to Be Predictable Charac-
ters", 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 878 (1998).
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Darcy, squandering his inheritance) that supports an inference that he
has character traits of deception, dissipation, and lechery, which in turn
support the inferences that he deceived her on the particular occasion
when he spoke to her of Darcy's maltreatment, and that he is likely to try
to seduce other young women of his acquaintance. Austen offers these
insights as truths that Elizabeth attains only by discarding her own inac-
curate assessments of Wickham's good moral character and character for
truthfulness; assessments she had used to conclude that he had indeed
been mistreated by Darcy.
Indeed, when Elizabeth realizes her error as to Wickham, she tries,
retrospectively, to reconcile conflicting proofs that are themselves proto-
types of demeanor and propensity evidence. She thinks, of Wickham:
His countenance, voice, and manner, had established him at once in
the possession of every virtue. She tried to recollect some instance of
goodness, some distinguished trait of integrity or benevolence, that
might rescue him from the attacks of Mr Darcy; or at least, by the pre-
dominance of virtue, atone for those casual errors, under which she
would endeavor to class, what Mr Darcy had described as the idleness
and vice of many years continuance. But no such recollection be-
friended her. She could see him instantly before her, in every charm of
air and address; but she could remember no more substantial good
than the general approbation of the neighbourhood, and the regard
which his social powers had gained him in the mess.-
In this passage, Austen explicitly juxtaposes "countenance, voice,
and manner," and "charm of air and address" with "some instance of
goodness, some distinguishing trait of integrity or benevolence," weigh-
ing the demeanor evidence that she has against the character evidence
that she lacks. In hoping to find some episode of good conduct, Elizabeth
implies that character as proven through propensity is, for her, a more
persuasive proof that the mere "charm of air and address" that she had
till then relied upon.
When Wickham runs off with Lydia, his character is determined ir-
revocably. Elizabeth says: "But Jane knows, as well as I do, what Wick-
ham really is. We both know that he has been profligate in every sense of
the word. That he has neither integrity nor honour. That he is as false
and deceitful, as he is insinuating .... This determination is, for Austen,
conclusive proof of Wickham's capacity to engage in conduct in confor-
mity with these character traits at any time in the future.
too. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 234-35.
IoI. Id. at 3oI.
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Similarly, with respect to Darcy, the difficulty is not whether charac-
ter can be a reliable predictor of future conduct, but rather how to de-
termine accurately what Darcy's character is: either "the proudest, most
disagreeable man in the world, .... or "the sweetest-tempered, most gen-
erous-hearted boy in the world."" 3 Austen allows Elizabeth to explain
this difficulty when, as Elizabeth's opinion of Darcy is beginning to
change, she encounters Wickham in Meryton. When Elizabeth says "I
think Mr Darcy improves on acquaintance," Wickham cries out in sur-
prise and asks whether Darcy has "improved in essentials."' 4 Elizabeth
replies: "In essentials, I believe, he is very much what he ever was....
When I said he improved on acquaintance, I did not mean that either his
mind or manners were in a state of improvement, but that from knowing
him better, his disposition was better understood.""° Accordingly, char-
acter is, for Austen, knowable and essential in determining facts; indeed
it is the pursuit of this knowledge that drives the narrative.
The Federal Rules of Evidence preclude this use of propensity, but
do permit a different treatment of propensity in the narrow instance of
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.'06 To that extent only, the
rules embrace Austen's view that character traits are reliable predictors
of conduct on a particular occasion, at least where the conduct involves
testifying. Austen's use of character is, however, far more broad. Once
we label an individual as being of good moral character, that label be-
comes a signifier for an array of traits that go well beyond the Federal
Rules' notion of truthfulness, to embrace good behavior in general. Eve-
rything from tact to generosity are expected of a person of good moral
character.
III. PRIVILEGE: RECALIBRATING THE BALANCE
There are several instances in Pride and Prejudice in which charac-
ters withhold information from the larger community of factfinders,
based upon a perceived need for confidentiality as a means of maintain-
102. Id. at 58 (opinion of the assembly at the first ball).
103. Id. at 270 (description of Darcy by the housekeeper).
104. Id. at 26o.
105. Id. at 26o-6i.
io6. See FED. R. EVID. 6o8(b) (permitting credibility of a witness to be attacked or supported by
evidence of specific instances of conduct, "if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness"); FED. R.
EVID. 6O9 (permitting evidence of prior convictions for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness).
It is interesting to consider whether a trial judge would permit evidence of Wickham's attempted
seduction of Georgiana as evidence of conduct probative of untruthfulness under 6o8(b). Its lascivious




ing a relationship, usually familial. In each of these instances, Austen
takes pains to reveal that the balance struck by those withholding infor-
mation -confidentiality versus disclosure-is wrongly calibrated and im-
poses excessive social costs. For her, privilege rules unreasonably thwart
accurate and just determinations of fact.
Most notably, Darcy determines to withhold from all others the cir-
cumstances of his young sister's near-elopement with Wickham. This se-
crecy operates to the great injury of Lydia Bennett. The closing third of
the novel is centered on the efforts he takes to repair that injury, and on
his acceptance of responsibility for Wickham's access to Lydia. Through
these efforts, which he tries in vain to keep secret, Darcy wins Elizabeth's
gratitude and respect.
But restricting access to information relevant to Wickham's charac-
ter and the danger he might represent to other young women is not
Darcy's doing alone. When Elizabeth learns from Darcy of the elope-
ment of Georgiana and Wickham, she confides in Jane, but together they
agree that the information should go no further. Elizabeth asks Jane
"whether I ought, or ought not to make our acquaintance in general un-
derstand Wickham's character," to which Jane replies: "Surely there can
be no occasion for exposing him so dreadfully."'" Elizabeth concurs
"'[t]hat it ought not to be attempted. Mr Darcy has not authorised me to
make his communication public. On the contrary every particular rela-
tive to his sister, was meant to be kept as much as possible to my-
self... .",8
The withholding of information regarding the elopement is calcu-
lated to protect and strengthen a relationship-here, Darcy's with his
young sister, Georgiana°-at the expense of access to intelligence that
would almost certainly affect the community's judgment of Wickham." '
107. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 253.
io8. Id. In fact, a close reading of Darcy's letter to Elizabeth reveals no such injunction. It is in-
stead apparently inferred by Elizabeth from the circumstances themselves. Nevertheless, Elizabeth
treats this as information that she is prohibited from sharing. Even after Lydia's flight, she tells Mrs.
Gardiner of Wickham's "infamous behavior to Mr Darcy," but continues, "[a]nd there are other cir-
cumstances which I am not at liberty-which it is not worth while to relate." Id. at 30.
io9. Id. at 231.
iIo. Protection of this relationship is, presumably, Darcy's motive in keeping the elopement a se-
cret, although Jane and Elizabeth seem animated by concern for Wickham more than for Georgina.
"To have his errors made public might ruin him forever," says Jane. Id. at 253. And Elizabeth reaf-
firms this later when she explains to Aunt Gardiner that Lydia knew nothing of Wickham's character:
Oh yes! -that, that is the worst of all. Till I was in Kent, and saw so much of both Mr Darcy
and his relation, Colonel Fitzwilliam, I was ignorant of the truth myself. And when I re-
turned home, the-shire was to leave Meryton in a week or fortnight's time. As that was the
case, neither Jane, to whom I related the whole, nor I, thought it necessary to make our
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As with most privileges,"' the question is whether that protection is justi-
fied given the cost to the factfinders of being deprived of information
critical to their determinations of the respective worth of Wickham and
Darcy."2
knowledge public; for of what use could it apparently be to any one, that the good opinion
which all the neighbourhood had of him, should be overthrown?
Id. at 301.
III. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I, Io (1996) ("Like the spousal and attorney-client
privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for confidence and
trust.") (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (I98o)); see R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing
Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1627, 1633 (2003) ("Under the utilitarian view, the privilege protecting confiden-
tial communications with clergy, like the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges, is
grounded in a policy of preventing disclosures that would tend to inhibit the development of a confi-
dential relationship that society has decided is socially desirable.").
The strengthening of a relationship is, however, not alone sufficient to warrant recognition of a
privilege for a particular communication. Instead, the touchstone for this balancing of interests has
long been Wigmore's four-factor test, which requires that all four considerations be met before a privi-
lege be recognized by a court:
(I) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedu-
lously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (1905). See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Historical
Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come Into Conflict with the Modern
Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 241, 242 (2002) (observing of Wigmore's treatise, "while the
doctrinal analysis in volume eight is terribly out of date, at a theoretical level the courts still look to the
evaluative criteria that Dean Wigmore prescribed in section 2285 of the volume for determining when
to recognize a privilege").
112. Scholars have debated the issue of the appropriate balance to be struck between disclosure
and protection of confidential communications throughout the history of such privileges. See WIG-
MORE, supra note I II, § 2291, at 3204 (observing, of the attorney-client privilege, that "[i]ts benefits are
all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete"): James J. Dalessio, Comment, Evi-
dentiary Principles and the Exclusion of Derivative Evidence: Commentary and Analysis, 26 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 625, 629 (1989) (quoting J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 193-94 (J. Mill. ed.,
1827)) (describing privileges as "one of the most pernicious and irrational notions that ever found its
way into the human mind"); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An
Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85 (1973) (describing privileges
as "mere bothersome exclusionary rules, born of competing professional jealousies, that impede the
accuracy of fact finding and serve no other important societal goals"); David W. Louisell, Confidential-
ity, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 1ot, 107-09 (1956)
(approving privilege rules as "protect[ing] significant human values" and their social costs as "secon-
dary and an incidental feature of [their] vitality"); see also Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidenti-
ality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 31, 31 (2000) ("Most evidentiary rules further the
search for truth.... The law of privileges is a stark exception because it conceals evidence that is
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Significantly, the relationship protected by Darcy's discretion is a
familial one, and hence is not within the traditional list of protected rela-
tionships to which rules of privilege have been addressed."3 Austen's
narrative plainly suggests that Darcy's conduct in protecting his young
highly reliable and probative."); Cassidy, supra note 1io, at 1687-99 (proposing limitations on the
priest-penitent privilege in light of the clergy abuse crisis).
Courts have also wavered in their assessment of the need for a rule of privilege as against the
need for the factfinder to have access to information. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 ("Testimonial
exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public... has a right
to every man's evidence.' As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very lim-
ited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good tran-
scend the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."')
(quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (195o), and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
234 (i96o)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 71o (1974) (noting that privileges "are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth"); Jaffee, 518 U.S.
at i9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cataloguing instances in which the Court has rejected new privileges, in-
cluding rejecting "privilege against disclosure of academic peer review materials" (citing Univ. of Pa.
v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201-02 (199o)), rejecting "privilege against disclosure of 'legislative acts' by
member of state legislature" (citing United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 374 (i98o)) and "con-
stru[ing] narrowly the scope of existing privileges," such as "permitting in camera review of documents
alleged to fall within crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege" (citing United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554, 568-70 (1989))). Federal Rule of Evidence 5Ol is a manifestation of the deep ambiva-
lence of courts in this area, since it is merely a choice of law provision rather than an attempt to codify
or homogenize the substance of privilege law. FED. R. EVID. 501.
113. The relationships most typically within the protection of exclusionary rules of privilege have
been those between attorney and client, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
("The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known
to the common law.") (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton Rev. i96I)); Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); doctor and patient, see Prink v. Rockefeller Ctr. Inc.,
398 N.E.2d 517, 520 (N.Y. '979); priest and penitent, see In re Grand Jury Investig., 918 F.2d 374, 377
(3d Cir. 199o); ANSONE STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 556 (1964)
("[I]n general the courts hold that the confidence which was recognized by the English common law as
existing between lawyer and client should also exist between physician and patient and between priest
as confessor and his parishioner or other penitent. This applies not only to the Roman Catholic
Church with its regular confessional but also to similar confidence between non-Catholic clergymen,
when acting as such, and their parishioners."); and husband and wife, see Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53
(recognizing rule of spousal disqualification that reposes with testifying spouse); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 333 (195); Wolfle v. U.S., 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (recognizing confidential marital com-
munication privilege).
Other relationships have, more recently, come within the shelter of newly recognized rules of
privilege, even while familial relationships have remained largely unprotected by such rules. Compare
Jaffee, 518 U.S. I, 17 (recognizing psychotherapist-patient privilege protecting not only licensed psy-
chologists and psychiatrists, but also licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy), with In re
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that "[a]lthough legal academicians appear to
favor adoption of a parent-child testimonial privilege, no federal Court of Appeals and no state su-
preme court has recognized such a privilege," and summarizing rationale). Accordingly, prosecutors
have been able to compel the testimony of Monica Lewinsky's mother, and others similarly situated,
before a grand jury and at trial.
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and orphaned sister is understandable, even laudable."14 Thus, it is some-
thing of a surprise that Austen's plot subjects Darcy's judgment as to the
need for secrecy to strong condemnation." 5
This narrative ambiguity as to the propriety of Darcy's choice of se-
crecy suggests two corresponding, and also antithetical, approaches to
the question of a familial privilege, one of which is to recognize a privi-
lege and the other of which is to deny it. Yet the case law as to this ques-
tion is more uniform, rejecting familial privilege., 6 This uniformity of
114. Austen writes, in Darcy's voice, in his long letter to Elizabeth at the midpoint of the novel:
My sister, who is more than ten years my junior, was left to the guardianship of my mother's
nephew, Colonel Fitzwilliam, and myself. About a year ago, she was taken from school, and
an establishment formed for her in London; and last summer she went with the lady who
presided over it, to Ramsgate; and thither also went Mr Wickham, undoubtedly by design;
for there proved to have been a prior acquaintance between him and Mrs Younge, in whose
character we were most unhappily deceived; and by her connivance and aid, he so far rec-
ommended himself to Georgiana, whose affectionate heart retained a strong impression of
his kindness to her as a child, that she was persuaded to believe herself in love, and to con-
sent to an elopement. She was then but fifteen, which must be her excuse; and after stating
her imprudence, I am happy to add, that I owed the knowledge of it to herself.
AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 231.
This fictional treatment of the need for confidentiality differs considerably with the judicial cali-
bration of that need as against the need for the information contained in a familial communication. In
In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at I 152, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
each of the Wigmore factors warranting recognition of a privilege was unmet. In particular, the court
held that "it is not clear whether children would be more likely to discuss private matters with their
parents if a parent-child privilege were recognized than if one were not," although Darcy proudly tells
Elizabeth, as a set off to Georgiana's imprudence in eloping, "that I am happy to add, that I owed the
knowledge of it to herself." AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 231. The court also held that "any injury to the
parent-child relationship resulting from non-recognition of such a privilege would be relatively insig-
nificant." In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1153.
While the case does not address sibling relationships, it seems likely that they would receive a
similarly dismissive treatment by that court. Austen, on the other hand, presents Darcy's solicitousness
as to Georgiana's interests as a virtue rather than a flaw, and presumes that a grave injury to their rela-
tionship would result from disclosure of the confidential information regarding her conduct.
115. The last third of the novel centers on the struggle to extricate Lydia from the consequences of
a rash elopement with Wickham that is nearly identical to that he nearly achieved with Georgiana.
Those who had been aware of Wickham's bad character-Elizabeth, Darcy, and Jane-suffer hind-
sight self-recriminations for having kept others in the dark ands therefore susceptible to Wickham's
predatory conduct. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 334 (Aunt Gardiner's letter to Elizabeth in which she tells
of Darcy's efforts to rescue Lydia, saying "[t]he motive professed, was his conviction of its being owing
to himself that Wickham's worthlessness had not been so well known, as to make it impossible for any
young woman of character, to love or confide in him"); id. at 294 (Elizabeth to Darcy upon learning of
the elopement: "'When I consider,' she added, in a yet more agitated voice, 'that I might have pre-
vented it!-I who knew who he was. Had I but explained some part of it only-some part of what I
learnt, to my own family! Had his character been known, this could not have happened."').
s6. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.2d at 1146 (noting that no federal court and no state supreme
court has recognized such a privilege, although scholars, on balance, favor such a privilege) (citing
Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, To Tell or Not to Tell? An Analysis of Testimonial Privileges:
The Parent-Child and Reporter Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 163 (1993); Daniel R.
Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599
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approach despite the fictional recognition of the issue's complexity, sug-
gests that the factors that have traditionally been brought to bear on a
determination of whether to cloak familial communications with privi-
lege are perhaps not the appropriate ones to employ, or have not been
accorded sufficient weight. For example, it seems obvious that the third
factor of Wigmore's classic test-whether the community is of the opin-
ion that the relationship in question ought to be "sedulously fostered"-
is at its strongest pitch with respect to familial relationships like those of
siblings or parent and child. Indeed, it is precisely this factor that informs
our sympathy for Darcy, because it accords with our intuited and accul-
turated sense that familial relationships are at the very top of any list of
relationships that are to be fostered by rules of privilege.
Moreover, from the biblical irony of Cain's question, "Am I my
brother's keeper,"'"7 to the contemporary poignancy of Theodore Kac-
zynski's capture based on information supplied by his brother, David,"8 it
has long been an unquestioned presumption across many cultures that
the relationship between siblings or between parent and child requires
confidentiality if it is to thrive."9 This second element of the Wigmore
(1970); David A. Schlueter, The Parent-Child Privilege: A Response to Calls for Adoption, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 35 (1987).
117. The passage reads:
And Cain talked with Abel, his brother; and it came to pass, when they were in the field,
that Cain rose up against Abel, his brother, and slew him. And the Lord said unto Cain,
"where is Abel, they brother?" And he said, "I know not. Am I my brother's keeper?" And
He said, "what hast thou done? the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the
ground. Am I my brother's keeper?"
Genesis 4:9 (King James).
18. Sumathi Reddy, "It Was Tearing Me to Pieces"; Kaczynski's Angst Over Brother's Fate, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, May 9, 2003, at A29.
David Kaczynski had not seen his brother in nine years when he read the Unabomber's
manifesto in 1995. His tip led the FBI to Theodore Kaczynski in April of 1996, the elusive
man who was responsible for package bombings that killed three and injured 23 over the
course of 17 years. In 1998, Kaczynski was sentenced to life in prison. He remains in a fed-
eral prison in Colorado. In a personal speech, Kaczynski chronicled the internal struggle
and anguish he experienced, first wondering if his brother was the Unabomber, then living
with the decision he made to tell the FBI his suspicions, and finally realizing he could be re-
sponsible for his own brother's death.
Id. Compare David Kaczynski's conduct to that of fugitive bomber Eric Rudolph's brother, Daniel.
If only William Faulkner were alive to set it down. In 2001, to protest his brother's fugitive
status, Daniel Rudolph rigged a camcorder on a tripod in his South Carolina garage. "This
is for the F.B.I. and the media," he said on the tape he would soon send to federal agents.
Then, dressed in a white shirt and a tie, he turned toward the spinning radial-arm saw. Mak-
ing sure to get a good shot, all alone in his closed garage, he lopped off his entire left hand.
After applying a tourniquet, he (off camera by now) drove himself to an emergency room.
An ambulance soon returned to fetch the severed hand, which was surgically reattached.
Allan Garganus, Why We Fed the Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, § 4, at 13.
I19. Additional examples include the recent drama in Boston in which James "Whitey" Bulger, an
alleged mobster charged with some nineteen murders, has evaded FBI capture while his brother, Wil-
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test 2' also counsels in favor of a privilege, and Austen's presentation of
the need for confidentiality as between Darcy and his sister/ward is per-
suasive on the point. How then can that factor go unmentioned in a judi-
cial application of the test to the relationship of a father and daughter?'
Austen explores the notion of privilege yet again, as a balancing of
these same competing interests, when she permits Elizabeth to withhold
from Jane not only Darcy's secret regarding his sister, but also the details
of Darcy's role in thwarting Charles Bingley's feelings for Jane. The let-
ter that Elizabeth receives from Darcy contains both bits of information,
and she participates with him in weighing the need for disclosure of
Georgiana's shame too lightly, as against the needs of the community to
be put on notice of Wickham's predatory past. But Austen does not con-
demn Elizabeth for withholding the ignoble role that her own lover has
played in dividing Bingley from Jane. Instead, she permits the reader to
approve the balancing of confidentiality against the free flow of informa-
tion, facilitating the central match of this marriage comedy, even as it
thwarts fulfillment of the secondary match. Jane is never permitted to
learn of or to express anger about Darcy's meddling, although Elizabeth
accuses him of being "the means of ruining, perhaps for ever, the happi-
ness of a most beloved sister ..... Instead, Austen writes of Elizabeth:
The tumult of Elizabeth's mind was allayed by this conversation. She
had got rid of two of the secrets which had weighed on her for a fort-
night, and was certain of a willing listener in Jane, whenever she might
wish to talk again of either. But there was still something lurking be-
hind, of which prudence forbad the disclosure. She dared not relate the
other half of Mr Darcy's letter, nor explain to her sister how sincerely
she had been valued by his friend. Here was knowledge in which no
one could partake; and she was sensible that nothing less than a perfect
understanding between the parties could justify her in throwing off this
last incumbrance of mystery. "And then," said she, "if that very im-
liam Bulger, President of the University of Massachusetts and former President of the Massachusetts
State Senate, asserts the privilege against self-incrimination in response to law enforcement inquiries
about his brother's whereabouts, see Jules Crittenden, Panel Grills Bulger; Victims' Kin Claim Billy's
All Blarney, BOSTON HERALD, June 20, 2003, at 6, and the Independent Counsel's subpoenaing of
Monica Lewinsky's mother to testify as to her knowledge of Lewinsky's relationship with former
President Clinton. See Judy Keen & Kevin Johnson, For Mom, Spotlight Could Burn, USA TODAY,
Feb. iI, 1998, at 4A (reporting that Marcia Lewis, Monica Lewinsky's mother, had testified before a
Grand Jury after her lawyer failed to quash a subpoena); William Satire, Privilege Proliferation, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A29 ("We do not need a Clintonian 'Bill of Privileges' saving politicians from
scrutiny, blocking the flow of truth and placing any class above the law."); Kate Novack, How Can We
Miss Her... , TIME, May 26, 2003, at 24 (noting that Lewinsky published an op-ed on Mother's Day
contending that parents and children should not have to testify against each other).
120. See supra note III (citing Wignore test for recognition of privilege).
121. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at I152.
122. AUSTEN, supra note 7, at 222.
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probable event should ever take place, I shall merely be able to tell
what Bingley may tell in a much more agreeable manner himself. The
liberty of communication cannot be mine till it has lost all value!" 23
In ruminating over how to proceed with this important confidence,
Elizabeth here overlooks a critical aspect of the "knowledge" that she
withholds: It is not that Bingley indeed loves Jane, but that Darcy has
persuaded him that Jane does not love him.
Indeed, so far from being condemned for his meddling, Darcy him-
self is credited with righting things by reassuring Bingley that Jane recip-
rocates his feelings for her.' 4 He does not even share the credit with
Elizabeth, who had first put him on notice of his own error of judgment
as to Jane's feelings.'25 Nor does he thank her for keeping his "absurd and
impertinent" "interference" a secret from Jane. The connection is simply
reestablished, with surprise and joy on the part of both Jane and Bingley,
and the novel ends with two marriages.
The relationship protected by this subterfuge is one between would-
be lovers, not yet husband and wife, whose relationship is, for much of
the time that the secret is withheld, characterized more by enmity than
affection, and reflects very little trust. While it may be that such a rela-
tionship partakes of the interests that undergird the marital privilege,
that privilege has, some would say grudgingly, been permitted to attach
only to consummated marriages between a man and a woman.
In the area of privilege, then, Austen does not offer any clear resolu-
tion of the thorny balancing of interests that underlies rules of privilege.
Instead, she carefully walks a line, allowing the reader to see the costs of
both confidentiality and disclosure, condemning both and neither. This
approach suggests that a discretionary, rather than a categorical, model
of privilege might work best, although the common judicial wisdom is
that rules of privilege, if they are to exist at all, must be clear and deter-
123. Id. at 253-54.
124. After Elizabeth accepts him, Darcy explains that
I made a confession to him, which I believe I ought to have made long ago. I told him of all
that had occurred to make my former interference in his affairs, absurd and impertinent.
His surprise was great. He had never had the slightest suspicion. I told him, moreover, that I
believed myself mistaken in supposing, as I had done, that your sister was indifferent to
him; and as I could easily perceive that his attachment to her was unabated, I felt no doubt
of their happiness together.
Id. at 379.
125. Elizabeth asks Darcy: "'Did you speak from your own observation,' said she, 'when you told
him that my sister loved him, or merely from my information last spring?"' He replies: "From the for-
mer. I had narrowly observed her during the two visits which I had lately made her here; and I was
convinced of her affection." Id. at 379. Earlier, he had acknowledged: "If you have not been mistaken
here, I must have been in an error. Your superior knowledge of your sister must make the latter prob-
able." Id. at 228.
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1 26minmate. At a minimum, the novel provides an opportunity to reflect onthe balance presently struck by rules of evidence.
CONCLUSION
Austen's exploration of the modes of proof relied upon in our quo-
tidian factfinding invites a number of areas of reflection on the proof
available to adjudicatory factfinders under existing rules of evidence,
sometimes augmenting traditional legal and social science scholarship,
sometimes challenging it. Austen invites us to reassess the voir dire and
deliberation processes in order to identify juror traits that might affect
the factfinder's assessment of different types of evidence. She offers sup-
port for a broader use of character evidence and against the propensity
ban. She also challenges our repose as to the balance of interests mani-
fested in certain established rules of privilege. I hope that these observa-
tions provide, if nothing else, good and sufficient reason to read, or
reread, the novel.
126. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 387-88 (1998) (refusing to terminate
the attorney-client privilege upon the death of the client). In Swidler, the Court held that "[blalancing
ex post the importance of the information against client interests, even limited to criminal cases, intro-
duces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application. For just that reason, we have rejected use
of a balancing test in defining the contours of the privilege." Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383,393 (1981)); see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (i96).
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